The prevention of electoral fraud: Interim report, Queensland Parliament LCARC -- majority and dissenting recommendations

   First, here are the main committee's conclusion and recommendations, in what the committee termed an INTERIM REPORT because of constraints of time and the fact that the Shepherdson Inquiry was proceeding during the committee's sittings. They are in chapter 9, pages 95 to 97, as follows:

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(i) continuing to forward the change of address data to electoral authorities to trigger the mailing out of AEC [Australian Electoral Commission] enrolment cards (to effect possible subsequent changes to enrolment details); and/or

(ii) introducing a system of automatic enrolment whereby electors filling out government forms (eg application and renewal forms; change of address forms) are given the option on that form to authorise the direct/automatic updating of their enrolment details.

The committee also suggests that, once the State government chooses to support option (i) and/or (ii), the new system be created to accommodate that option or combination of options accordingly.

In terms of the ECQ's [Electoral Commission Queensland's] role as manager of the proposed State enrolment verification system, the committee also believes that:

• the functions and powers of the ECQ contained in s 8 of the Electoral Act should be amended to provide for corresponding ECQ duties and responsibilities in this regard; and
  
  
• once the system is in place, funding for the ECQ should be increased to specifically support its role as manager of the system.

(a) the Premier (as the Minister responsible for the coordination of government administration) and the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Minister for The Arts (as the minister responsible for the Electoral Act 1992) authorise the development of a State-based enrolment verification computer system capable of capturing and interrogating a range of data from State Government departments and agencies for the purpose of verifying and providing the updated enrolment details to the Australian Electoral Commission;

(b) such a system be developed and maintained by CITEC under the management and control of the Electoral Commission Queensland;

(c) the system be developed with appropriate legislative safeguards ensuring the protection of individuals' privacy and additionally, in the case of silent electors, their safety. Such safeguards should include privacy principles relating to the use, collection, storage and disclosure of data for electoral roll maintenance purposes;

(d) the system be developed in close consultation with the Australian Electoral Commission and be subject to the overview of the Joint Roll Management Committee;

(e) before the system is put in place, CITEC (in conjunction with the Electoral Commission Queensland) be funded to conduct a preliminary study to:

• identify the information that is available on State databases and determine cost effective means of using the information to verify and update enrolment details;
  
  
• determine the most effective ways to audit the accuracy and integrity of enrolment details as a means of preventing and detecting electoral fraud;
  
  
• estimate the cost of establishing and managing a State enrolment verification computer system and whether such a system is useful to other Government services and whether there is potential to offset operating costs against such services;

(f) the preliminary study also consider and report on the advantages and disadvantages of:

(i) continuing to forward the change of address data to electoral authorities to trigger the mailing out of AEC enrolment cards (to effect possible subsequent changes to enrolment details); and/or

(ii) introducing a system of automatic enrolment whereby electors filling out government forms (eg application and renewal forms; change of address forms) are given the option on that form to authorise the direct/automatic updating of their enrolment details;

(g) once the State Government chooses to support option (i) and/or (ii) above, the system be accordingly created with the capacity to accommodate that option; and

(h) the system be developed with 'spot on the earth' as its basis rather than either elector name or address as its basis, if feasible to do so.

3. The committee further recommends that in addition to the actions suggested by the committee above, the Premier and the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Minister for The Arts, in conjunction with the Electoral Commission Queensland, initiate immediate discussions with the Australian Electoral Commission to explore options to escalate fraud audit procedures prior to the next State election.

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   Their dissenting report recommends cleansing the rolls and increasing vigilance and penalties. Pagination is in Roman capitals, I - VIII

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(MRS J GAMIN MP, MR D BEANLAND MP & DR P PRENZLER MP)

This dissenting report is presented by non-government members of the Committee to give a proper balance to the matters considered.

As the Committee is required by Parliament to report, and the majority Committee insists on conforming to this reference by producing an Interim Report, then a firm commitment should have been given to issuing a Final Report with specific recommendations for legislative amendments to the Electoral Act 1992. It is imperative that these are dealt with by the Parliament prior to the next State election.

The majority Committee has chosen to whitewash issues surrounding the corruption of the electoral roll and elections without giving any such commitment. Moreover, the majority Committee has decided to whitewash issues surrounding important changes to the Electoral Act that need to be implemented by early next year if the people of Queensland are to have any confidence in the electoral rolls at the next State election.

The Premier is on record as saying that amendments will be made to the Electoral Act prior to the next election, but the majority Committee has shown a marked disinclination to make a commitment to this timetable.

Enrolment identification, witnessing provisions for new enrolments, identification of voters on polling day and closure of the rolls when an election is called are all matters that require legislative amendments. It is important to stress that the current electoral rolls have clearly been corrupted and will therefore require cleansing.

It is because of this corruption that the people of Queensland are demanding decisive action. Accordingly, non-government members are prepared to spell out these very serious issues, and to put forward recommendations which must be implemented by any government serious about electoral reform prior to the next State election, although subject to refinement or revision if the findings of the Shepherdson inquiry oblige us to do so. The Shepherdson report may or may not be received before the next State election is called, but the people of Queensland must be allowed to go into that process with the knowledge that electoral processes have been overhauled.

On the motion of the Member for Nicklin, the Committee was instructed by the Parliament to investigate and report back on the best ways to minimise electoral fraud at elections where the Queensland State electoral roll is used. The Committee was asked to consider ways of improving the conduct of State and Local Government elections, and was advised not to extend its inquiry into consideration of the conduct of Federal elections.

It must be emphasised at the outset that Federal considerations cannot be totally ignored, especially as the electoral roll is prepared and maintained by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, as authorised by the joint roll arrangement between the State and the Commonwealth. For instance, it is not practical for Queensland to differ from the Commonwealth in enrolment requirements.

On the motion of the Leader of the Liberal Party, Dr David Watson MP, as amended by the Attorney General Hon Matt Foley MP, the Committee was also instructed to consider and report upon proof of identity requirements for enrolment and for voting.

It is interesting to note that the Australian Labor Party was the only political party to make a submission to LCARC opposing identification when enrolling or voting.

The Shepherdson inquiry into electoral fraud is currently proceeding and evidence before this inquiry is far from complete. The Committee is therefore reporting to Parliament without the benefit of the

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Examples of electoral fraud and manipulation of electoral rolls have resulted in the conviction of three members of the Australian Labor Party in Townsville, together with a great deal of additional information being presented to the on-going Shepherdson inquiry. Although names have been suppressed from publication, a number of government (ALP) Members of Parliament have been named at the inquiry for a variety of reasons, including witnessing false applications for electoral enrolment.

Comments continue to be made by prominent ALP personnel that "rule changes have now prevented roll rorting". This is obviously a red herring, and it is pointed out that criminal manipulation of electoral rolls is not covered by party rules, or prevented in the future by party rules. There can be no comparison between disputes over internal Labor Party membership and the fraudulent enrolment of voters and the impersonation of voters for criminal purposes.

The Shepherdson inquiry has concentrated on its specified terms of reference, and there is every probability that criminal behaviour is much more widespread across Queensland State and Federal electorates than has ever been imagined. In addition, this criminal behaviour may be widespread throughout the nation.

Proven cases of criminal electoral fraud and systemic manipulation of electoral rolls and voting procedures will make it necessary in the future to institute appropriate safeguards, such as enrolment identification and witnessing provisions for new enrolments, voting day identification, closure of rolls and roll cleansing.

It is now apparent that fraudulent enrolment procedures were not only undertaken for the purpose of internal Australian Labor Party pre-selections, but were also used by perpetrators of fraudulent enrolments in order to vote at State and Federal elections, and no doubt Local Government elections as well.

The Commonwealth and State Electoral Commissioners say that electoral fraud is not being perpetrated in any widespread fashion, but public allegations persist of widespread and organised vote rigging on a sophisticated and highly organised basis.

It is also disturbing to see allegations of establishment of a "slush fund" for the purpose of internal ALP rorting, but with the clear potential for a subsequent or flow-on effect of manipulation of electoral rolls, and elections.

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The AEC and the Electoral Commission Queensland (ECQ) can no longer bury their heads in the sand while sophisticated and highly organised corruption occurs.

It is of concern to non-government members that AEC simply does not have the ability, in terms of staff and resources, to check all of the applications for enrolment that flood in between calling of any State or Federal election and the date of closure of the rolls.

Detection of multiple voting can only occur post-election by scanning of dual and multiple marks on the certified lists. ECQ makes it clear that the scanning system is effective in detecting cases of multiple voting only after the event. It does not detect offenders who multiple vote in different names. This can be done by fictitious enrolments, or by impersonation when votes are cast in the names of persons on the roll who the offender believes will not be voting at the election.

The majority Committee report refuses to make definite conclusions on a number of important matters such as pre-enrolment identification, voter identification at polling place or by postal vote, closure of electoral rolls when an election is called, and cleansing of the current rolls. The majority Committee has talked about beefing up penalties without dealing specifically with problems. In indicating that it will re-visit these serious issues, the majority Committee agrees that it will not do so before the Shepherdson report is finalised, and most probably will not do so in time for the next State election.

Forced enrolment linked to 18+ card (touched on in Chapter 9, committee decision)

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Government majority members of the Committee have supported the position that electoral enrolment should be a condition to being granted an 18+ Card, and have advised the Electoral Commissioner accordingly. Non government members voted against this proposal. This moves well away from the Committee's previously stated position that an 18+ Card application form should only provide an optional opportunity to concurrently enrol.

Non-government members of the Committee are strongly opposed to the compulsory aspects of applications for 18+ Cards. It is ludicrous that an 18 year old school leaver must be forced to enrol before he/she can go to a night-club. The 18+ card is currently even more unreliable than the electoral rolls, as there is already a flourishing trade in bogus 18+ Cards; this will only increase that trade. The proposal also fails to address the issue of many 18+ persons who are not already Australian citizens and therefore not entitled to vote but who may seek an 18+ card as proof of age identification.

Enrolment is compulsory in this country, and voting is compulsory. However, prospective enrollees should not be forced onto the electoral rolls by being refused such rights as an identification (18+) card or driver's licence. This is real Big Brother government at its worst.

Non-government members did not support this proposal.

LCARC Report no. 19 Implications of the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements - tabled March 2000

The Minister for Justice and Attorney General has made several references in the House to the above report, and the unanimous concerns of all Committee members at the original proposals put forward by the Commonwealth. As well as identification requirements for persons wishing to enrol for the first time, there were only a limited number of persons qualified to witness new enrolments.

The Committee shared the view that these stringent regulations would only serve to deter prospective first time enrollees, rather than to encourage them to enrol.

Importantly there was no specific evidence brought to the Committee's attention of any widespread electoral fraud or manipulation of electoral rolls. It was unfortunate that no pertinent material was available to LCARC when Report No. 19 was issued in March 2000.

The Commonwealth has done more work on proposed regulations. In view of considerable evidence now available, non-government members believe that there must be a requirement for proof of identification of a person wishing to enrol for the first time, and a tightening up of witness requirements. The Committee now needs to re-visit Report 19, particularly as new Commonwealth regulations have been provided and must be considered. Non-government members are of the view that this latest round of proposed Commonwealth regulations have become too weak and need to be strengthened. As they presently stand, electoral corruption can still too easily occur.

@ Non-government members of the Committee support the continuation of joint roll sharing arrangements with the Commonwealth.

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Non-government members are broadly supportive of a limited de-centralised data matching system, which has been in place since March 1999. However, non-government members do not believe that CRU (Continuous Roll Updating by means of data matching) will by itself de-contaminate or cleanse electoral rolls.

The majority Committee report goes over the top in promoting ECQ suggestions for a $7 million super computer system. The ECQ suggestions need to be examined in more detail and not simply accepted on face value for a quick fix, as the majority Committee has expressed in Chapter 9. The super computer proposal will not stop electoral corruption.

CRU will assist in maintaining the roll, it will not cure existing ills. The majority Committee has declined to recommend definitive action to cleanse the electoral roll, but creation of a State multi-million dollar super computer system to process new State name and address data has all the hallmarks of BIG BROTHER. Details of all Queenslanders will be contained on this multi-million dollar super computer system, which is simply another form of the discredited Australia Card without a card.

Privacy issues are of the utmost importance and have not been addressed

It should be remembered that even Microsoft has been unable to make itself immune from hacking, nor has the Pentagon. Moreover, before any State data matching occurs, privacy safeguards need to be put in place to ensure that adequate privacy provisions cover access. Currently it would appear that no privacy provisions exist. If privacy provisions in a non-centralised system are hopelessly inadequate, it will be impossible to put privacy provisions in place for a centralised system.

@ Suggestions have been made that, in order to thoroughly cleanse the electoral roll, the whole State should be re-enrolled. Accordingly, non-government members recommend consideration of the submission made by Emeritus Professor Colin Hughes, whose electoral experience cannot be questioned. Further consultation with Professor Hughes is recommended.

@ Professor Hughes suggests a "pilot" of roll cleansing in one federal division, and non-government members recommend this be widened to cover the whole State. Professor Hughes suggests that once a decision is made as to what tighter enrolment procedures should be, current electors should be notified that new requirements are in place, and that with a prescribed period they should comply and effect a new enrolment. After the initial response, one reminder letter should be sent to the remainder. Precise habitation reviews should deal with those remaining on the existing roll that have not been verified under the new procedures. If there is confirmation of details on the old roll then transfer to a new roll could occur.

@ Non-government members believe that an immediate start should be made on a statewide basis. If there are difficulties with the physical checks of precise habitation reviews, the process could be commenced with State electorates on margins of less than 5%, together with a comprehensive voter awareness program stressing that it is essential for people to re-enrol because the ALP has corrupted the current electoral rolls.

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Public confidence in fair elections is paramount in a fair and democratic society to ensure the liberty of the people.

RECOMMENDATIONS

@ Recommendation 1: Joint roll with Commonwealth

Joint roll sharing arrangements with the Commonwealth should continue.

Non government members support the continuation of joint roll sharing arrangements with the Commonwealth.

@ Recommendation 2: Provisions for new enrolments

Persons wishing to enrol for the first time must be adequately identified to the person who witnesses the enrolment application.

The Commonwealth has produced a number of draft enrolment requirements, the latest of which is dated October 2000. Non-government members believe these current regulations have now become too loose and are again open to corruption by the type of sophisticated and well-organised operations of which there is now evidence. Queensland should work closely with the Commonwealth to ensure an effective level of enrolment identification and witnessing requirements.

Witnesses to new enrolments should personally know the proposed enrollee for a period of time.

@ Recommendation 4:

There should be extremely severe penalties for breaches of witnessing regulations.

@ Recommendation 5: Identification of voters at polling booths

Voters should be required to produce a form of card identification at polling places before being issued with ballot papers. Some appropriate forms of card ID may be driver's licence, social security card, credit card, passport, university student ID card.

Non government members had initially expressed interest in the Queensland Electoral Commissioner's suggestion of date of birth as voter identification - full date of birth to be printed on roll used at the polling place, voter to state at least date and month of birth. Since then we have become aware of recent claims by Australian Labor Party campaign workers in respect of widespread vote rigging in certain electorates by use of the electronic roll sorted alphabetically into street addresses. We are of the view that date of birth identification (which appears on the electronic roll whether sorted alphabetically by name or street order) would be readily available to persons attempting to manipulate voting figures by impersonating voters.

@ Recommendation 6:

Persons witnessing Postal Vote applications must indicate what ID has been sighted.

@ Recommendation 7:

There should be more severe penalties for enrolment offences and impersonation.

@ Recommendation 8: Closure of electoral rolls

Electoral rolls must close at the calling of an election.

Closure of electoral rolls at the time of calling an election will prevent a last minute rush to enrol with consequent inability of AEC staff to check the bona fides of literally thousands of persons wishing to enrol at the last minute, and the inability of AEC staff to ensure that accurate information is recorded at such pressure.

Non-government members of the Committee are well aware that there will be criticism that this recommendation will disenfranchise persons who wish to enrol or to change enrolment at the last minute. Our response is that it is the responsibility of each person to ensure that his/her enrolment is up to date, and it is not the responsibility of government to keep rolls open until well after an election has been called.

This recommendation will also allow the Electoral Commission to provide earlier printed rolls to candidates, as well as electronic up-dates. It will go a long way towards ensuring the accuracy of the rolls.

ECQ can commence an appropriate public awareness program to encourage voters to get onto the roll, or to correct existing enrolments.

@ Recommendation 9: Cleansing of Queensland State electoral roll

A system of roll cleansing should be commenced immediately on a statewide basis.

As existing rolls are not only grossly inaccurate but certainly corrupt, and in view of recent claims by Australian Labor Party workers in respect of vote rigging in certain electorates, a general statewide cleansing process must be commenced as soon as possible as discussed on page V of this Dissenting Report. ECQ should make a start by writing to all persons asking them to re-enrol. Respondents should be immediately re-enrolled. Non-respondents could be given one reminder, then habitation checks.

Non-government members of the Committee are strenuously opposed to the creation of a super-computer system where all Queenslander's names, addresses and other details are listed. This is a return to Big Brother, and a return to the discredited Australia Card without the card. We are concerned that the majority report supports this concept and that little or no attention has been given to its vast ramifications.

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This document you are reading was derived from the original internet document, and has been carefully checked for inadvertent errors. In the original the page numbers are at the bottom of each page, but during the transformation the numbers appeared at the top -- and in this version they have been left there, because it assists the reader.

The original source is http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Comdocs/LegalRev/LCAR028.pdf , which is 424 kilobytes, 117 pages long, and requires Adobe® Acrobat® Reader™. Depending on your modem and the condition of the internet, it might take 7.5 to 10 minutes to download.
The Majority Recommendations are well towards the end, at item 9.7 on page 96.
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