Prevention of electoral fraud: parliamentary interim report, Queensland

There was a main conclusion and recommendation, which recommended the continuation of the updating systems, adoption of a "spot on the earth" method of checking for multiple fictitious enrolments at a convenience address, and spending more money on technology, plus "... immediate discussions with the Australian Electoral Commission to explore options to escalate fraud audit procedures prior to the next State election."

There was also a dissenting minority report, signed by three members, which stated that the evidence given to the Shepherdson Inquiry and other information meant that the rolls had been corrupted so badly that urgent cleansing of the rolls ought to occur, and the penalties for false enrolment and voting ought to be greatly increased.

MAJORITY REPORT

First, here are the main committee's conclusion and recommendations, in what the committee termed an INTERIM REPORT because of constraints of time and the fact that the Shepherdson Inquiry was proceeding during the committee's sittings. They are in chapter 9, pages 95 to 97, as follows:

Specifically, this preliminary study should consider and report on the advantages and disadvantages of:

(i) continuing to forward the change of address data to electoral authorities to trigger the mailing out of AEC [Australian Electoral Commission] enrolment cards (to effect possible subsequent changes to enrolment details); and/or

(ii) introducing a system of automatic enrolment whereby electors filling out government forms (eg application and renewal forms; change of address forms) are given the option on that form to authorise the direct/automatic updating of their enrolment details.

The committee also suggests that, once the State government chooses to support option (i) and/or (ii), the new system be created to accommodate that option or combination of options accordingly.

In terms of the ECQ's [Electoral Commission Queensland's] role as manager of the proposed State enrolment verification system, the committee also believes that:

• the functions and powers of the ECQ contained in s 8 of the Electoral Act should be amended to provide for corresponding ECQ duties and responsibilities in this regard; and
  
  
• once the system is in place, funding for the ECQ should be increased to specifically support its role as manager of the system.

The committee makes the following recommendations as a logical and desirable 'next step' to facilitate and expedite the development of CRU for State purposes. The committee intends to provide a further report to Parliament on other matters raised during this inquiry at a later time.

9.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To facilitate and expedite the development of CRU as a means of preventing electoral fraud in Queensland and to provide the State with an enhanced capacity to detect and deter enrolment fraud through conducting 'fraud audits', the committee recommends that:

(a) the Premier (as the Minister responsible for the coordination of government administration) and the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Minister for The Arts (as the minister responsible for the Electoral Act 1992) authorise the development of a State-based enrolment verification computer system capable of capturing and interrogating a range of data from State Government departments and agencies for the purpose of verifying and providing the updated enrolment details to the Australian Electoral Commission;

(b) such a system be developed and maintained by CITEC under the management and control of the Electoral Commission Queensland;

(c) the system be developed with appropriate legislative safeguards ensuring the protection of individuals' privacy and additionally, in the case of silent electors, their safety. Such safeguards should include privacy principles relating to the use, collection, storage and disclosure of data for electoral roll maintenance purposes;

(d) the system be developed in close consultation with the Australian Electoral Commission and be subject to the overview of the Joint Roll Management Committee;

(e) before the system is put in place, CITEC (in conjunction with the Electoral Commission Queensland) be funded to conduct a preliminary study to:

• identify the information that is available on State databases and determine cost effective means of using the information to verify and update enrolment details;
  
  
• determine the most effective ways to audit the accuracy and integrity of enrolment details as a means of preventing and detecting electoral fraud;
  
  
• estimate the cost of establishing and managing a State enrolment verification computer system and whether such a system is useful to other Government services and whether there is potential to offset operating costs against such services;

(f) the preliminary study also consider and report on the advantages and disadvantages of:

(i) continuing to forward the change of address data to electoral authorities to trigger the mailing out of AEC enrolment cards (to effect possible subsequent changes to enrolment details); and/or

(ii) introducing a system of automatic enrolment whereby electors filling out government forms (eg application and renewal forms; change of address forms) are given the option on that form to authorise the direct/automatic updating of their enrolment details;

(g) once the State Government chooses to support option (i) and/or (ii) above, the system be accordingly created with the capacity to accommodate that option; and

(h) the system be developed with 'spot on the earth' as its basis rather than either elector name or address as its basis, if feasible to do so.

3. The committee further recommends that in addition to the actions suggested by the committee above, the Premier and the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Minister for The Arts, in conjunction with the Electoral Commission Queensland, initiate immediate discussions with the Australian Electoral Commission to explore options to escalate fraud audit procedures prior to the next State election.

MINORITY RECOMENDATIONS

The minority, three MsP, dissented from the majority report. They wrote: "The majority Committee has chosen to whitewash issues surrounding the corruption of the electoral roll and elections ... Moreover, the majority Committee has decided to whitewash issues surrounding important changes to the Electoral Act that need to be implemented by early next year if the people of Queensland are to have any confidence in the electoral rolls at the next State election."

Their dissenting report recommends cleansing the rolls and increasing vigilance and penalties. To read it, click the original report at http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Comdocs/LegalRev/LCAR028.pdf, and find the Dissenting Report at the end, following page 99, in pages numbered (I) to (VIII). If you cannot get a connection for that webpage, click the full report, or here

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p 52 for opinion of JSCEM after the 1996 federal election that: "it is unacceptable that the most fundamental transaction between a citizen and the government - the act of choosing the government at a democratic election - is subject to a far lower level of security than such lesser transactions as opening a bank account, applying for a passport, applying for a driver's licence or registering for social security benefits, to name but a few."

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There are a total of 117 pages in the whole document.
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p 96 --
9.7 RECOMMENDATIONS 1. To facilitate and expedite the development of CRU as a means of preventing electoral fraud in Queensland and to provide the State with an enhanced capacity to detect and deter enrolment fraud through conducting 'fraud audits', the committee recommends that: (a) the Premier (as the Minister responsible for the coordination of government administration) and the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Minister for The Arts (as the minister responsible for the Electoral Act 1992) authorise the development of a State-based enrolment verification computer system capable of capturing and interrogating a range of data from State Government departments and agencies for the purpose of verifying and providing the updated enrolment details to the Australian Electoral Commission;

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Dissenting recommendations include, on p (V)
@ Non-government members believe that an immediate start should be made on a statewide basis. If there are difficulties with the physical checks of precise habitation reviews, the process could be commenced with State electorates on margins of less than 5%, together with a comprehensive voter awareness program stressing that it is essential for people to re-enrol because the ALP has corrupted the current electoral rolls.

The list of dissenting recommendations are on pp (VI) onwards. One of their conclusions is:
It is obvious that a very large degree of sophistication and a high level of organisation have become part of the fraudulent manipulation of electoral rolls. We disagree with the bland interpretation that "there's nothing really wrong", and we take exception to the majority Committee's whitewash of the extremely serious situation where the Queensland and Commonwealth electoral rolls have been contaminated and corrupted.

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LEGAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE

REPORTS DATE TABLED 1. Annual report 1995-96 8 August 1996 2. Report on matters pertaining to the Electoral Commission of Queensland 8 August 1996 3. Review of the Referendums Bill 1996 14 November 1996 4. Truth in political advertising 3 December 1996 5. Report on the Electoral Amendment Bill 1996 20 March 1997 6. Report on the study tour relating to the preservation and enhancement of individuals' rights and freedoms and to privacy (31 March 1997—14 April 1997) 1 October 1997 7. Annual report 1996-97 30 October 1997 8. The Criminal Law (Sex Offenders Reporting) Bill 1997 25 February 1998 9. Privacy in Queensland 9 April 1998 10. Consolidation of the Queensland Constitution - Interim report 19 May 1998 11. Annual report 1997-98 26 August 1998 12. The preservation and enhancement of individuals' rights and freedoms in Queensland: Should Queensland adopt a bill of rights? 18 November 1998 13. Consolidation of the Queensland Constitution: Final Report 28 April 1999 14. Review of the Report of the Strategic Review of the Queensland Ombudsman (Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative Investigations) 15 July 1999 15. Report on a study tour of New Zealand regarding freedom of information and other matters: From 31 May to 4 June 1999 20 July 1999 16. Review of the Transplantation and Anatomy Amendment Bill 1998 29 July 1999 17. Annual report 1998-99 26 August 1999 18. Issues of electoral reform raised in the Mansfield decision: Regulating how-to- vote cards and providing for appeals from the Court of Disputed Returns 17 September 1999 19. Implications of the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements 2 March 2000 20. The Electoral Amendment Bill 1999 11 April 2000 21. Meeting with the Queensland Ombudsman (Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative Investigations) regarding the Ombudsman's Annual Report to Parliament 1998 - 1999 19 April 2000 22. The role of the Queensland Parliament in treaty making 19 April 2000 23. Issues of Queensland electoral reform arising from the 1998 State election and amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 31 May 2000.DATE TABLED 24. Review of the Queensland Constitutional Review Commission's recommendations relating to a consolidation of the Queensland Constitution 18 July 2000 25. Annual report 1999-00 19 July 2000 26. The Report of the strategic management review of the Offices of the Queensland Ombudsman and the Information Commissioner 19 July 2000 27. Review of the Queensland Constitutional Review Commission's recommendation for four year parliamentary terms 28 July 2000 PAPERS DATE TABLED Truth in political advertising (Issues paper) 11 July 1996 Privacy in Queensland (Issues paper) 4 June 1997 The preservation and enhancement of individuals' rights and freedoms: Should Queensland adopt a bill of rights? (Issues paper) 1 October 1997 Upper Houses (Information paper) 27 November 1997 Inquiry into issues of Queensland electoral reform (Background paper) 25 November 1999 The role of the Queensland Parliament in treaty making (Position paper) 25 November 1999 Freedom of Information in Queensland (Discussion paper) 8 February 2000 Four year parliamentary terms (Background paper) 11 April 2000 Review of the Queensland Constitutional Review Commission's recommendations relating to a consolidation of the Queensland Constitution (Position paper) 27 April 2000 Inquiry into the prevention of electoral fraud (Issues paper) 8 September 2000

i CHAIR'S FOREWORD Since March 1999, Australia's system for maintaining the integrity of the electoral roll has gone through a major revolution that has been largely unnoticed by the public at large as well as commentators.

I am referring to the introduction of the 'continuous roll updating' (CRU) system.

According to electoral authorities, it is a system that is fifty percent implemented and is already yielding better enrolment results than the former two yearly periodic door to door canvas method that it has replaced.

This is one reason why this inquiry has faced limitations in terms of the conclusions and recommendations that it has been able to reach at this point in time.

That is, the effect of the CRU system upon the integrity and completeness of the electoral roll and the prevention and detection of fraud is not entirely clear because we are still, at most, midpoint in its implementation.

The second aspect which limits the inquiry's capacity to reach comprehensive conclusions and recommendations is the fact that the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) inquiry into certain allegations of electoral fraud in Queensland chaired by the Hon T Shepherdson QC is not yet complete.

While there is now ongoing disclosure of specific evidence before that inquiry, Hon Shepherdson at this point provides no conclusion about the level of electoral fraud historically or at present, nor about the future risk of such fraud.

These limitations have left the committee with a dilemma as to what conclusions and recommendations it could form now in relation to its inquiry and which areas of reform should be the subject of further consideration after the completion of the Shepherdson CJC inquiry.

This dilemma is resolved by placing the agenda of reform options into two categories.

The first category of reform options contain a range of matters that may be described as 'systemic' in nature as they apply to the efficient and effective maintenance of the electoral roll in general and the advancement of the CRU system capabilities in particular.

The committee felt confident about forming conclusions and recommendations in this sphere.

First, because the conclusions and recommendations regarding CRU contained in previous reports (no 19 and no 23) of the committee, provide a logical foundation for these conclusions; second, because of the strong supporting evidence provided by the electoral authorities; and third, because such measures will serve to strengthen the system that is in place to deter and detect electoral fraud without infringing upon the fundamental principles on which our electoral system is balanced.

The conclusions and recommendations of this report therefore amount to a set of measures to facilitate and expedite the development of the CRU system.

These measures should also expand the ultimate capacity of the CRU system to enhance the integrity of the electoral roll and deter and detect electoral fraud.

The recommendations of this report are aimed at providing Queensland with: (a) its own computer-based data facility to reconcile State databases with the Commonwealth-maintained Queensland electoral roll, enabling enhancement of the roll's integrity;.

ii (b) the capacity to effectively conduct fraud audits of the Commonwealth electoral roll data; (c) an advanced data collection system based upon a geographic spot on the map; and (d) additional capacity to implement strategies to encourage enrolment via various State agencies.

In essence, if these recommendations are adopted and implemented by the Government, they will provide the Electoral Commission Queensland with capacity to more effectively fulfil its charter with regard to maintaining the electoral roll.

In doing so, the recommendations will also provide a data system that is subsequently capable of being fine tuned to specifically address a particular level of perceived risk of electoral fraud in the future.

It is this perception of the risk of electoral fraud and the capacity of an enhanced CRU system to deter and detect fraud that must inform the next stage of this inquiry as the committee proceeds to report on other matters raised during this inquiry.

The second category of reform options contains a list of reforms such as introducing proof of identity requirements at the point of enrolment and voting.

These reforms, in general, represent a departure from the finely balanced set of principles upon which our current electoral system is constructed.

These principles were established through the rigours of the post-Fitzgerald years via EARC and its Parliamentary committee PEARC.

The committee has taken the view that because of the limitations under which this inquiry has operated as outlined above, it would be unwise to recommend fundamental changes to these carefully crafted principles without far greater clarity as to the actual current levels of electoral fraud that are the subject of the Shepherdson inquiry; what the full impact of such changes may be; and what risks of electoral fraud would be addressed by such changes.

The committee's course is not intended to deny in any way the extreme seriousness of the matters that led to the initiation of this inquiry and which are now the subject of the CJC Shepherdson inquiry.

That is why the committee wishes to make it profoundly clear that this is an 'interim report' of the committee.

All reform matters such as proof of identity at enrolment will be placed firmly on the agenda for future consideration by the committee regardless of whether the committee has previously expressed a view about such reforms or not.

The committee will examine afresh all such matters of reform after Hon Shepherdson has reported.

I must now briefly address two problematic issues that underpin this inquiry and which will be key to the next stage of the inquiry.

Here I refer to the closely connected matters of first, citizens' privacy where various data concerning an individual is compiled via the CRU system, and, second, the establishment of the identity of an individual who seeks registration on the electoral roll.

The problem starts at the point of establishing the identity of an individual who seeks registration on the electoral roll, for there are 'two' critical pieces of data that are essential to the integrity of the electoral roll.

That is, the valid registration of a citizen on the roll requires not only having sound verification of 'proof of identity' but also 'proof of address'.

The difficulty that therefore arises is, that there is no single piece of identification that reliably satisfies both of these requirements for every citizen.

.iii What CRU addresses is that 'proof of identity' and 'proof of address' is not locked in one document.

'Who we are' and 'where we live' is established by reference to a set of information that citizens leave behind in the normal conduct of their lives like footprints in the sand.

Intelligent correlation of this set of information ensures that the integrity of the electoral roll is the subject of constant vigilance by the electoral authorities as it constructs a data web through which a person intending to commit electoral fraud will find it very difficult to navigate.

The array of data concerning a citizen's identity and location that is created via an enhanced CRU system gives rise to legitimate concerns about privacy.

These concerns should be addressed via well-established privacy principles to effectively protect citizens.

Caution must be exercised by this committee in progressing to the next stage of this inquiry and great responsibility must be exercised by those with a capacity to influence the public debate that will ensue, to ensure that public examination of these issues proceeds on a well informed basis.

The thorough research and the compilation of views at the foundation of this report should be closely examined in order to now guide public consideration of these matters.

In this regard, I note the editorial in The Courier-Mail of 8 November 2000 which argues that suggestions such as proof of identification before enrolment and closure of rolls on the day an election is officially called 'should be examined thoroughly'.

The same editorial argues that 'The Shepherdson inquiry has shown preservation of the status quo is no longer an option'.

Clearly defining the status quo in this report has been an elusive exercise as we track the evolving CRU system.

I thank the members of the committee for their hard work in completing this report.

On behalf of the committee I wish to thank Mr Des O'Shea, Queensland's Electoral Commissioner, and Mr Bob Longland, the Australian Electoral Commission's Electoral Officer for Queensland, and their staff, for their extremely valuable assistance.

I would also like to thank Mr Ian Dickson, former New South Wales Electoral Commissioner, whom the committee engaged as a consultant for this inquiry, for providing the committee with his valuable insights as the report was being prepared.

On behalf of the committee I wish to pay special tribute to the staff of the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee secretariat: Mr David Thannhauser, Acting Research Director; Ms Sarah Lim, Acting Senior Research Officer; and Ms Tania Jackman, Executive Assistant, who have displayed a Herculian effort in completing a lengthy and complex report within the limited time frame demanded by the Parliament and against the dynamic background within which the issues that are the subject of this report have unfolded.

Gary Fenlon MP Chair.

CONTENTS Page No. 1. THE REFERENCE AND THE INQUIRY PROCESS................................................... 1 1.1 BACKGROUND.. 1 1.1.1 The committee ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.1.2 The reference ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 THE INQUIRY PROCESS..................................................................................................................... 3 1.2.1 Issues paper ........................................................................................................................ 3 1.2.2 Call for submissions............................................................................................................ 3 1.2.3 Requests for information..................................................................................................... 4 1.2.4 Hearing ............................................................................................................................... 5 1.2.5 General ............................................................................................................................... 5 2. CONTEXT OF THE INQUIRY..................................................................................... 6 2.1 THE CJC INQUIRY ............................................................................................................................ 6 2.2 THE JSCEM INQUIRY....................................................................................................................... 7 2.3 MOTION IN PARLIAMENT, 5 SEPTEMBER 2000 ................................................................................ 8 2.4 LATEST DRAFT COMMONWEALTH REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF IDENTIFICATION AT ENROLMENT , ETC ....................................................................................... 9 2.4.1 Latest version of the Commonwealth regulations .............................................................. 9 2.4.2 The impetus to the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements .................................... 10 2.5 PREVIOUS COMMITTEE COMMENT ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF IDENTITY AT ENROLMENT ......................................................................................................... 11 2.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTORAL MATTERS................................................................................. 13 2.6.1 Concurrent review of local government electoral matters............................................... 13 2.6.2 Local government electoral matters in this report ........................................................... 13 3. NATURE OF THE INQUIRY, INITIAL CONCLUSIONS AND CONTENT OF THE REPORT ................................................................................................................... 15 3.1 NATURE OF THE INQUIRY ............................................................................................................... 15 3.1.1 Conclusions about the integrity of the roll and the need for reforming enrolment procedures ........................................................................................................................ 17 3.1.2 Conclusions about the integrity of the voting process and the need for reforming polling procedures ............................................................................................................ 17 3.1.3 Nature of this report ......................................................................................................... 18 3.2 OVERVIEW OF REMAINDER OF REPORT.......................................................................................... 19 4. EXISTING CHECKS AND BALANCES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS .............. 20 4.1 INTRODUCTION—QUEENSLAND'S ELECTORAL SYSTEM................................................................ 20 4.2 'GLOBAL' CHECKS AND BALANCES ............................................................................................... 22 4.2.1 An independent electoral commission .............................................................................. 22 4.2.2 Disputing electoral results—The Court of Disputed Returns........................................... 23 4.2.3 Monitoring and review......................................................................................................23 4.2.4 Enrolment and voting offences and their enforcement ..................................................... 25.Page No. 4.3 ENROLMENT CHECKS AND BALANCES ........................................................................................... 26 4.3.1 Overview of Queensland's enrolment arrangements ....................................................... 27 4.3.2 Public availability of the electoral roll and the objection process .................................. 28 4.3.3 The AEC's maintenance of the electoral roll—the move to continuous roll updating..... 30 4.3.4 Ensuring the integrity, timeliness and accuracy of the roll through continuous roll updating ............................................................................................................................ 32 4.3.5 CRU—The way forward.................................................................................................... 35 4.4 VOTING CHECKS AND BALANCES................................................................................................... 35 4.4.1 Detection of multiple voting—post-election scanning of dual and multiple marks on the certified lists................................................................................................................ 36 4.4.2 Detection of 'cemetery voting'.......................................................................................... 36 4.4.3 Scrutineers ........................................................................................................................ 37 4.4.4 Security of ballot papers ................................................................................................... 39 4.4.4.1 Printing of ballot papers ................................................................................................. 39 4.4.4.2 Tampering with ballot papers......................................................................................... 39 4.4.4.3 Supply and transport of ballot papers............................................................................. 40 4.4.4.4 Storage of ballot papers.................................................................................................. 41 4.4.5 Issuing officers' questioning of voters.............................................................................. 41 4.4.6 Extra-ordinary voting ....................................................................................................... 42 4.4.6.1 Postal voting................................................................................................................... 43 4.4.6.2 Special postal voting ...................................................................................................... 44 4.4.6.3 Pre-poll in person and absent voting .............................................................................. 44 4.4.6.4 Unenrolled voting........................................................................................................... 45 4.4.6.5 Declared institution voting and voting in remote areas .................................................. 45 4.4.6.6 Electoral visitor voting................................................................................................... 45 4.5 SUMMARY ...... 46 5. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM GENERALLY—EFFECTIVENESS............................. 47 5.1 FORMS OF ELECTORAL FRAUD AND THE CAPACITY OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM GENERALLY TO PREVENT THE 47 5.2 PAST ANALYSES BY AUTHORITIES OF ALLEGATIONS OF ELECTORAL FRAUD................................. 50 5.3 SUBMISSIONS TO THIS COMMITTEE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM GENERALLY.... 53 6. 'GLOBAL' CHECKS AND BALANCES—EFFECTIVENESS AND OPTIONS ......... 55 6.1 AN INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION ................................................................................. 55 6.2 COURT OF DISPUTED RETURNS...................................................................................................... 56 6.3 OFFENCES....... 56 6.4 CONCLUSION.. 59 7. VOTING PROCEDURES—EFFECTIVENESS AND OPTIONS ............................... 60 7.1 EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING VOTING PROCEDURES TO PREVENT AND DETECT VOTING FRAUD... 60 7.1.1 Scanning of the certified lists............................................................................................60 7.1.2 Scrutineers ........................................................................................................................ 60 7.1.3 Questioning of voters ........................................................................................................ 61 7.1.4 Security of ballot papers—printing, tampering, supply and transport ............................ 61 7.1.5 Extraordinary voting......................................................................................................... 62.Page No. 7.2 VOTING PROCEDURES—REFORM OPTIONS.................................................................................... 64 7.3 CONCLUSION.. 68 8. ENROLMENT PROCEDURES—EFFECTIVENESS AND OPTIONS....................... 69 8.1 EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING ENROLMENT PROCEDURES TO PREVENT AND DETECT ENROLMENT FRAUD........................................................................................................................ 69 8.2 ENROLMENT PROCEDURES—REFORM OPTIONS............................................................................. 70 8.3 CONCLUSION.. 74 9. THE WAY FORWARD—A SEPARATE STATE-BASED ENROLMENT VERIFICATION SYSTEM ......................................................................................... 75 9.1 INTRODUCTIO 75 9.2 THE INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTORAL ROLL ..................................................................................... 76 9.3 PREVIOUS COMMITTEE COMMENTS ENDORSING CRU ACTIVITIES............................................... 77 9.4 FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA MATCHING, DATA MINING AND DIRECT ENROLMENT ELEMENTS OF CRU ....................................................................................................................... 82 9.5 THE WAY FORWARD—A SEPARATE STATE-BASED ENROLMENT VERIFICATION COMPUTER SYSTEM TO ENHANCE CRU ACTIVITIES IN QUEENSLAND............................................................. 86 9.5.1 Comments received by the committee about the development of a State enrolment verification computer system ............................................................................................ 87 9.5.2 Committee conclusions about a State enrolment verification computer system .............. 92 9.6 CONCLUSION.. 95 9.7 RECOM SION.....96 APPENDIX A: SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED..................................................................... 98 APPENDIX B:RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION.............................. 99 DISSENTING REPORT...................................................................................................... I.The prevention of electoral fraud 1 1. THE REFERENCE AND THE INQUIRY PROCESS 1.1 BACKGROUND 1.1.1 The committee The Parliamentary Committees Act 1995 establishes the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee (LCARC; 'the committee') as a statutory committee of the Queensland Legislative Assembly. The Act provides that the committee's broad areas of responsibility include legal reform, constitutional reform, administrative review reform and electoral reform. The Act also states that the committee's statutory responsibility regarding electoral reform includes monitoring generally the conduct of elections under the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) and the capacity of the Electoral Commission Queensland to conduct elections. The Parliamentary Committees Act provides that statutory committees are to additionally 'deal with' an issue referred to it by the Legislative Assembly. 1.1.2 The reference On 22 August 2000, the Legislative Assembly—on the motion of Mr Peter Wellington MP, seconded Mr Gary Fenlon MP (Chair of this committee)—resolved: That this House requests the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee to investigate and report back to State Parliament by 14 November 2000 on the best way to minimise electoral fraud at elections, where the Queensland State electoral roll is used. The committee subsequently resolved to conduct an inquiry into the prevention of electoral fraud (enrolment fraud and voting fraud) in Queensland state, local government and aboriginal and island council elections. The committee prepared an issues paper in relation to its inquiry (the issues paper is discussed further in the next section). In its issues paper, the committee noted the following comments made by Mr Wellington during the debate in the Assembly on his motion: My motion does not intend to empower this committee to take over the role of the Police Service or the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission in relation to investigating past allegations of electoral fraud in this State. ... For the purposes of this motion and the ambit of my requested investigation, it is my intention that the investigation be limited to ways of improving the conduct of State and local government elections and not be extended to a consideration of the conduct of Federal elections.1 In light of Mr Wellington's comments, the wording of the motion and the committee's State-focussed jurisdiction, the committee stated in its issues paper that it considered that the inquiry referred to it by the Assembly comprised an inquiry into ways of preventing electoral fraud in relation to: ·an election of a member or members of the Queensland Legislative Assembly, and the conduct of those elections by the Electoral Commission Queensland (ECQ) under Queensland's Electoral Act 1992; 1 Hansard, Queensland Legislative Assembly, 22 August 2000 at 2567-2568..The prevention of electoral fraud 2 ·an election of a councillor or councillors of local governments, and the conduct of those elections by the chief executive officer of the local government (or another returning officer—or the ECQ in the case of the Brisbane City Council if the council enters into an agreement with the ECQ to conduct the election) under: the Local Government Act 1993 (Qld) ('the LGA'), Chapter 5 (ss 289 to 441); the City of Brisbane Act 1924 (Qld), Part 2, Division 3; and Queensland's Electoral Act; ·an election of a councillor or councillors under the Community Services (Aborigines) Act 1984 (Qld) and the Community Services (Torres Strait) Act 1984 (Qld); ·State referendums conducted under the Referendums Act 1997 and referendums conducted under the LGA, Chapter 3, Division 7; and ·the maintenance of the electoral roll (the roll is used for the purposes of federal, state and local government elections) by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918—as authorised by the joint roll arrangement referred to in s 62 of Queensland's Electoral Act—but not the conduct of federal elections. The committee considered that 'electoral fraud' in its widest sense might mean anything that threatens the integrity of the electoral system. The 'electoral system' was defined by the former Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) as the system that 'provides an electoral process which includes voter qualification, candidate eligibility, apportionment of seats, rules for the conduct of elections, and laws which govern the mechanics of converting votes into seats'.2 However, the committee stipulated in its issues paper that it did not consider the terms of the Assembly's motion as being so wide as directing the committee to revisit such broad matters as: ·the setting of electoral boundaries; ·the redistribution process; ·voter qualification or candidate eligibility per se; ·the method of voting in Queensland elections; ·requirements concerning electoral funding and financial disclosure;3 ·the powers of the Court of Disputed Returns;4 and ·the registration of political parties.5 2 Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC), Report on the Queensland Legislative Assembly electoral system, GoPrint, Brisbane, November 1990 at 1.10. 3 This committee has previously reported on some aspects of electoral funding and disclosure. See the committee's report no 23, Issues of Queensland electoral reform arising from the 1998 State election and amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, GoPrint, Brisbane, May 2000. 4 This committee has previously reported on matters concerning the Court of Disputed Returns. See the committee's report no 18, Issues of electoral reform raised in the Mansfield decision: Regulating how-to-vote cards and providing for appeals from the Court of Disputed Returns, GoPrint, Brisbane, September 1999. 5 Such a delineation of the terms of reference was generally not referred to, or objected to, in submissions received by the committee, except that the National Party of Australia (Queensland Division) submitted that fraudulent registration of political parties (an issue addressed recently by the Commonwealth Parliament) should have been addressed by the committee because the 'fraudulent registration of political parties ... does have the capacity to generate fraudulent electoral results'. Several submitters (submission nos 3, 19, 20 and 26) also referred to misleading and deceptive electoral advertising, including how-to-vote cards, as a method of perpetrating electoral fraud. The issue of misleading how-to-vote cards has been comprehensively addressed by this committee previously: report no 4, Truth in political advertising,.The prevention of electoral fraud 3 Instead, the committee considered that the phrase 'the best way to minimise electoral fraud' contained in the Assembly's reference to the committee compelled the committee to focus upon means of preventing fraudulent practices in relation to enrolment procedures and the casting and recording of votes.

Fraudulent electoral practices include what the AEC has previously described as 'time-honoured methods of manipulating elections results, such as multiple voting, cemetery voting, vacant lot enrolment, and roll-stacking in marginal electorates'.6

In relation to the 14 November 2000 deadline for the committee to report, Mr Wellington said during parliamentary debate on the motion on 22 August 2000 that such a deadline would: ... enable Queenslanders interested in minimising electoral fraud at elections the opportunity to tell us how the current system can be improved prior to the next State election.7 1.2 THE INQUIRY PROCESS 1.2.1 Issues paper As mentioned above, the committee tabled an issues paper, Inquiry into the prevention of electoral fraud,8 in the Legislative Assembly on 8 September 2000 to guide and facilitate the making of submissions to its inquiry. In its issues paper, the committee outlined: ·the context in which it is inquiring, and referred to other inquiries being undertaken into matters germane to the subject matter of this inquiry [see chapter 2 (Context of the inquiry) below]; ·preliminary committee comments about the Queensland electoral system and the various checks and balances in the system that are aimed at ensuring the integrity of the electoral process [this matter is the subject of chapter 4 (Existing checks and balances in the electoral process) below]; ·some conclusions previously drawn by electoral authorities [the AEC, the Commonwealth Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) and the ECQ] about the incidence of enrolment and voting fraud; and ·this committee's previous reports on electoral matters. The issues paper also specified 28 issues relating to the prevention of electoral fraud that submissions might address and included a glossary of electoral terms.9 1.2.2 Call for submissions The committee called for public submissions in response to its issues paper. The committee advertised its call for submissions on Saturday 9 September 2000 in The Courier-Mail, Cairns Post, Rockhampton Morning Bulletin and Townsville Bulletin, and—during the week GoPrint, Brisbane, December 1996; report no 18, n 4; and report no 20, The Electoral Amendment Bill 1999, GoPrint, Brisbane, April 2000. 6 Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), Multiple voting, Electoral Backgrounder No 9, AEC, Canberra, July 1998 at , downloaded 22 August 2000. 7 Hansard, n 1 at 2568. The next State general election must be called by the end of July 2001. 8 The issues paper is available at: < http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/comdocs/legalrev/LCIP0009.pdf>. 9 See section 8 of, and the glossary to, the issues paper, n 8..The prevention of electoral fraud 4 commencing 11 September 2000—in the following Queensland regional dailies: the Bundaberg News Mail; Fraser Coast Chronicle; Gladstone Observer; Gold Coast Bulletin; Gympie Times; Ipswich Queensland Times; Mackay Daily Mercury; Mt Isa North West Star; Sunshine Coast Daily; Toowoomba Chronicle; Torres News Pty Ltd; Warwick Daily News; and the Weipa Bulletin. Apart from newspaper advertising, the committee directly wrote to approximately 420 persons and organisations that it identified as having a potential interest in the subject matter of the inquiry. The committee's letter enclosed a copy of the issues paper and asked for submissions from those persons and organisations, which included: ·members of the Queensland Legislative Assembly, including ministers; ·Queensland political parties; ·Queensland local governments, and aboriginal and island councils; ·Queensland Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; ·ministers responsible for electoral legislation in other jurisdictions, and local government departments in other jurisdictions; ·various legal and political science academics; and ·other relevant persons and organisations. Submissions closed on 6 October 2000, although the committee continued to accept submissions past that date. The committee received 29 submissions to its inquiry. The committee tabled in Parliament 26 (non-confidential) submissions on 18 October 2000, and will table one further submission on 14 November 2000 when it tables this report. A list of those persons and organisations who made submissions to the committee's inquiry appears as Appendix A.10 1.2.3 Requests for information In addition to forwarding copies of the issues paper to them, the committee made the following written requests of certain organisations: ·the ECQ, asking a series of specific questions focussing on procedures and measures currently employed by the ECQ (and the AEC, in relation to enrolment procedures) to ensure integrity in the electoral process and, specifically, to guard against fraudulent electoral and enrolment activity. The committee also asked for information about the impact of various possible reform options aimed at preventing electoral fraud. (In relation to enrolment matters, the committee asked the ECQ to consult with the AEC in preparing its response—the committee had understood that the AEC would not be directly submitting to the committee in light of the AEC concurrently preparing a submission to the JSCEM inquiry into the integrity of the electoral roll and incidents of enrolment fraud—the JSCEM inquiry is referred to below in section 2.2.);11 10 Submissions can be viewed at the Bills and Papers Office, Parliament House, Brisbane. The Electoral Commission Queensland's (ECQ) submission (no 11) dated September 2000 is available via the committee's website at . 11 The ECQ subsequently did consult with the AEC in preparing the ECQ submission. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, this committee has not had time to meaningfully consider the detailed AEC submission to the JSCEM inquiry, important as that submission is to the consideration of matters concerning the prevention of electoral fraud. (This committee was at the stage of considering the Chair's draft report when the AEC's submission to the JSCEM was tabled and publicly released on 31 October.The prevention of electoral fraud 5 ·the Department of Communication and Information, Local Government, Planning and Sport (Local Government Services), asking similar questions in relation to local government elections; ·the Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy and Development, asking similar questions in relation to aboriginal and island council elections; and ·all interstate electoral commissioners/electoral officers, asking for information about any measures aimed at preventing electoral fraud that have been implemented or proposed in their jurisdictions during the last 15 years. The committee also asked for any previously gathered evidence about the incidence of voting or enrolment fraud in those jurisdictions. The committee tabled in Parliament on 18 October 2000 (along with submissions) three such responses to committee requests for information. The committee intends to table one further response on 14 November 2000 when it tables this report. A list of those agencies who responded to the committee's request appears as Appendix B.12 1.2.4 Hearing On 24 October 2000, the committee held a hearing relating to the inquiry, asking questions of: ·the Electoral Commission Queensland (Mr Des O'Shea, Electoral Commissioner; Ms Trudy Aurisch, Deputy Electoral Commissioner; Mr Garry Wiltshire, Manager, Operations); ·the Australian Electoral Commission (Mr Bob Longland, Australian Electoral Officer (Queensland); Mr Peter Spelman, Director of Enrolment and Business Planning); and ·Mr Terry Tibbits, returning officer for numerous past State and local government elections. While the hearing was not open to the public on the day, the committee intended to subsequently publish the transcripts of it and will table in Parliament the transcript of that hearing when it tables this report on 14 November 2000. The committee will also publish the transcript on it's web site at . 1.2.5 General The committee has now considered all submissions, the evidence gathered at its hearing and its other research. In addition, the committee has sought and considered the advice of Mr Ian Dickson (New South Wales Electoral Commissioner for 15 years until November 1999) as a consultant on a number of matters associated with the inquiry. 2000.) The committee did, however, receive evidence from AEC representatives at its hearing—see section 1.2.4. 12 The response from the ECQ was in the form of a submission and tabled as such..The prevention of electoral fraud 6 2. CONTEXT OF THE INQUIRY The committee has undertaken its inquiry in a context of considerable media and political attention to issues surrounding recent allegations of fraudulent electoral activities (specifically and at least initially, fraudulent enrolment activities) in Queensland. That attention follows the now well-publicised successful prosecutions in Townsville of Ms Karen Ehrmann and Messrs Andrew Kehoe and Shane Foster for past forging and uttering of Commonwealth—ie AEC—electoral enrolment forms in relation to Australian Labor Party (ALP) plebiscites for pre-selection. The most recent prosecution, that of Ms Ehrmann, has led to a raft of allegations of other instances of electoral fraud, and public calls from a number of sources for various reforms to the electoral process. The seriousness of the above events provided impetus to not only this committee's inquiry but also to investigations into allegations of past instances of electoral/enrolment fraud by: ·Queensland's Criminal Justice Commission (CJC); and ·the Commonwealth Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM). In addition, the above events appear to have led to: ·a motion in the Queensland Legislative Assembly on 5 September 2000 moved by the Leader of the Queensland Liberal Party, Dr David Watson MP, calling for proof of identity requirements for enrolment and for voting. The motion was successfully amended by the Attorney-General, Hon Matt Foley MP, to effectively refer Dr Watson's motion to this committee as part of its inquiry; and ·heightened attention to revised drafts of regulations that would give effect to recent (but as yet uncommenced) amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 requiring, amongst other things, proof of identity when people enrol. This committee has, in its report no 19 in March 2000, already commented (in an adverse manner) on the new Commonwealth requirements for proof of identity at enrolment. These and other important background matters and developments are discussed in the remainder of this chapter. The impact of these developments (particularly that of the CJC and JSCEM inquiries) on the committee's conduct of this inquiry is discussed in chapter 3. 2.1 THE CJC INQUIRY On 22 August 2000, the CJC appointed independent counsel, Mr Phillip McMurdo QC, to examine information gathered during preliminary CJC investigations into certain allegations of electoral fraud. On obtaining advice from Mr McMurdo QC, the CJC resolved on 5 September 2000: 1. To conduct an investigation into any alleged official misconduct, by way of conduct which constitutes or could constitute a criminal offence or offences: (a) affecting the electoral roll relevant to the conduct in 1996 of a plebiscite within the Australian Labor Party to select its candidate for the State electorate of Townsville; (b) affecting the electoral roll for the by-election for the seat of Mundingburra held in 1996;.The prevention of electoral fraud 7 (c) affecting the electoral roll relevant to the conduct in 1993 of a plebiscite within the Australian Labor Party to select its candidate for the Brisbane City Council ward of East Brisbane; (d) affecting the electoral roll relevant to the conduct in 1993 of a plebiscite within the Australian Labor Party to select its candidate for the Brisbane City Council ward of Morningside; 2. To conduct an investigation into such other alleged conduct, which constitutes or could constitute a criminal offence, in respect of any plebiscite conducted within the years 1993 to 1997 inclusive for the selection of the candidate of the Australian Labor Party for any electorate of the Legislative Assembly or the position of councillor of any local government within Queensland, in respect of which there could be a reasonable suspicion of official misconduct; 3. To undertake such preliminary investigations as are appropriate to determine whether there is a reasonable suspicion of official misconduct in relation to anything which constitutes or could constitute a criminal offence, in respect of any plebiscite conducted within the years 1993 to 1997 inclusive and as otherwise described in paragraph 2 above;...13 The CJC further resolved to engage Hon Tom Shepherdson QC to conduct the investigation and report thereon. The ramifications of Hon Shepherdson's inquiry for the committee's current inquiry are substantial, and are discussed in chapter 3 below. 2.2 THE JSCEM INQUIRY On 23 August 2000, the Commonwealth Special Minister of State asked the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters to examine the issue of the integrity of the electoral roll and fraudulent enrolment.14 At its meeting on 5 September 2000, the JSCEM agreed that in examining the matter it would inquire into and report on: ·the adequacy of the Commonwealth Electoral Act for the prevention and detection of fraudulent enrolment; ·incidents of fraudulent enrolment; and ·the need for legislative reform. The JSCEM called for public submissions on 9 September 2000 (coincidentally, the day this committee advertised for submissions). Submissions to that inquiry closed on 13 October 2000. On 31 October 2000, the JSCEM publicly released some 27 submissions made to it, including a detailed submission from the AEC to the JSCEM on enrolment processes and their integrity. Unfortunately, because on 31 October 2000 this committee was in the process of finalising its report to meet the procedural requirements of reporting by 14 November 2000 as requested, this committee has not had the opportunity to examine the AEC submission to the JSCEM in any depth. The committee has not had the opportunity to examine the other submissions to the JSCEM at all. 13 Terms of reference attached to a CJC press release dated 6 September 2000. 14 Letter from Special Minister of State (Senator the Hon Chris Ellison) to JSCEM dated 23 August 2000..The prevention of electoral fraud 8 A media report on 14 October 2000, stated the JSCEM intended to commence public hearings in November 2000. 15 2.3 MOTION IN PARLIAMENT, 5 SEPTEMBER 2000 On 5 September 2000, the Leader of the Liberal Party, Dr David Watson MP, moved the following motion in the Queensland Legislative Assembly: In view of the conviction of three ALP identities for electoral corruption by rorting the electoral rolls for Federal, State and Local Government elections, this House calls on the Queensland Government to amend the Electoral Act to require proof of identity and address from all voters before ballots are cast, and calls upon the Commonwealth to amend the Commonwealth Electoral Act to require proof of identity and address before a person may be registered on the electoral roll.16 Dr Watson stated that, in light of the above-mentioned convictions of ALP figures for electoral fraud, and allegations that other people had perpetrated electoral fraud: ... we can fix the future. We can take steps to make sure that it does not happen again. The first and most logical step is to tighten up the enrolment and polling requirements. That means proof of identity and address to register and vote.17 Dr Watson acknowledged that this committee had previously expressed reservations in its report no 19 18 (discussed below in section 2.5) about recent (but as yet uncommenced) amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act that would require, amongst other things, proof of identification to be produced when people enrolled. Dr Watson argued, though, that the committee's reservations in that report were no longer valid: ... because they were based on the official assurances that electoral fraud was not a major problem and a preliminary concern that the Commonwealth's requirements were unduly onerous. ... there is now a clear need for these reforms and no valid objection.19 Dr Watson envisaged that almost any form of identification (driver's licences, student identification and Medicare cards, etc) would be acceptable. Dr Watson suggested that, indeed, the new Commonwealth requirements did not go far enough, in that proof of identity and address should also be required of electors at the ballot box. The Attorney-General, Hon Matt Foley MP, successfully moved the following amendment to Dr Watson's motion: Insert the following words before 'In view'— '1. The House notes the conclusion in Report No. 19 of March 2000 by the all-party Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee that the Commonwealth's "new enrolment requirements have the potential to effectively disenfranchise a significant number of voters"; 15 Franklin, M & Callinan, R, 'Federal Labor MP interviewed over Oxley rort claim' The Courier-Mail, 14 October 2000 at 4. 16 Hansard, Queensland Legislative Assembly, 5 September 2000 at 2935. 17 Hansard, n 16 at 2936. 18 LCARC, report no 19, Implications of the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements, GoPrint, Brisbane, March 2000. 19 Hansard, n 17 at 2936..The prevention of electoral fraud 9 2. The House further notes that on 22 August 2000 it requested the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee to "investigate and report back to State Parliament by 14 November 2000 on the best way to minimise electoral fraud at elections, where the Queensland State electoral roll is used."; and 3. The House requests that Committee to include in the said investigation and report consideration of Dr Watson's motion that'.20 During the debate on the motion, various members made arguments for and against introducing requirements for proof of address and identity to be shown when enrolling and when voting.21 2.4 LATEST DRAFT COMMONWEALTH REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF IDENTIFICATION AT ENROLMENT , ETC 2.4.1 Latest version of the Commonwealth regulations During the current inquiry, there has been renewed focus on the draft Commonwealth regulations that would specify how two significant recent, but as yet uncommenced, amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 22 would be put into effect. The two amendments are as follows. First, the Commonwealth Electoral Act has been amended so that the identity of a person enrolling for the first time must be verified in the manner prescribed by regulations. Prior to the amendment (and until such time as the relevant amendment commences and regulations are promulgated), there was no requirement for first-time electors, or electors changing their enrolment details, to produce proof of identity to enrol. Further, a person who claims to be an Australian citizen because of a grant of Australian citizenship under the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, must have their citizenship verified before they can be enrolled. (See new subsections 98(2A), (2B), (2C) and (2D) of the Act.) Secondly, witnessing requirements for enrolment cards have been made more stringent. The Commonwealth Electoral Act has been amended so that all enrolments 23 including transfers of enrolment must be witnessed by a person who is: (a) currently enrolled; and (b) in a class of electors prescribed by regulation. (See new s 98(2)(c) of the Act.) This committee reported on those amendments in its report no 19 Implications of the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements.24 (See section 2.5 below.) During the course of this committee's inquiry, Special Minister of State, Hon Senator Chris Ellison, released a number of press statements (dated 23 August 2000, 30 August 2000 and 18 October 2000) referring to the desirability of implementing the draft Commonwealth 20 Hansard, n 17 at 2938. 21 Hansard, n 17 at 2937-2946. 22 The amendments were made by the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act (No. 1) 1999 (Cth). That Act was passed by the Commonwealth Parliament on 23 September 1999 (assented to on 13 October 1999). The amendments have not yet commenced. 23 That is, a claim for enrolment or transfer of enrolment or a claim for age 17 'provisional' enrolment. Provisional enrolment of 17 year olds is permitted under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s 100. 24 LCARC report no 19, n 18..The prevention of electoral fraud 10 regulations. Senator Ellison's media release of 18 October 2000 referred to the Senator's release on that day of a further updated form of the draft Commonwealth regulations. 2.4.2 The impetus to the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements The October 1999 amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act concerning enrolment procedures largely stem from a report of the JSCEM on the 1996 federal election.25 (That committee has, since the 1984 general election, publicly inquired into, and reported on, the conduct of each federal election.) One of the substantive issues which the JSCEM considered was the topic of electoral fraud. The inquiry's most contentious topic was the question of whether current enrolment and voting procedures can prevent, or even detect, electoral fraud. Electoral fraud can encompass multiple voting (in the names of existing electors, or in false names deliberately placed on the roll for the purpose), being enrolled for the wrong House of Representatives electorate, or being a foreign citizen or underage. Obviously some of these circumstances can also arise through misunderstanding on the part of electors, rather than deliberate attempts at fraud. The inquiry did not reveal improper enrolment or voting sufficient to affect any result at the election. However, it is unacceptable that the most fundamental transaction between citizen and the government—the act of choosing the government at a democratic election—is subject to a far lower level of security than such lesser transactions as opening a bank account, applying for a passport, applying for a driver's licence or registering for social security benefits, to name but a few.26 Following consideration of a range of measures suggested to it (to combat electoral fraud), the majority of the JSCEM concluded that: Having examined the evidence to the inquiry, the Committee believes that the witnessing requirement on the enrolment form should be upgraded, that electors should have to produce at least one form of proof of identity for enrolment, that the government should expedite cross-checking of electoral data with information held by other agencies, that new enrolments should cease on the day the writ for an election is issued and that subdivisional voting should be re-examined.27 Despite the fact that the JSCEM recommendations were aimed at combating electoral fraud, three members of the committee in a minority report stated that: The Committee has not been presented with any substantive material indicating the existence of electoral fraud. It has been limited to anecdote and hearsay. Despite a dearth of evidence that alleged loopholes are being abused, there are, in the Majority Report, serious new moves to complicate enrolment. The outcome will be discouragement of prospective and past re-enrolling voters.28 25 JSCEM, The 1996 federal election: Report of the inquiry into the conduct of the 1996 federal election and matters related thereto, AGPS, Canberra, June 1997. 26 JSCEM, report on the 1996 federal election, n 25 at 2.1-2.2. 27 JSCEM, report on the 1996 federal election, n 25 at 2.4. The majority report was presented by Liberal Party and National Party members of the committee. 28 JSCEM, report on the 1996 federal election, n 25 at 119. The minority report was presented by the committee's three ALP members: Senator S Conroy, Mr L Ferguson MP and Mr R McClelland MP. A minority report was also submitted by Senator Andrew Murray (Australian Democrats), though, Senator Murray's report did not address the majority's recommendations regarding the new enrolment requirements..The prevention of electoral fraud 11 Further comments made by the JSCEM in that report are referred to in section 5.2 of this report. A copy of the JSCEM's report and the government's response to the committee's recommendations made in that report can be viewed via the JSCEM's web page at: . 2.5 PREVIOUS COMMITTEE COMMENT ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF IDENTITY AT ENROLMENT This committee, in its report no 19 of March 2000, 29 has previously commented disapprovingly about the above-mentioned new Commonwealth enrolment requirements. Because the possibility of requiring proof of identify at enrolment is one of the major reform options for the prevention of electoral fraud, it is prudent to reproduce the following comments made by the committee its report no 19. The committee believes that the changes to the Commonwealth's enrolment requirements have the capacity to effectively disenfranchise a significant number of eligible voters and hence reduce the number of citizens on the electoral roll. The committee appreciates that the regulations are still to be finalised and that there is scope for the impact of the new requirements to be lessened by, for example, broadening the category of witnesses. However, in the committee's opinion it remains that the inconvenience—not to mention potential cost—to citizens of requiring first-time voters to produce an original form of identification and requiring enrolment cards to be witnessed by certain prescribed persons has the potential to effectively put such significant hurdles in the way of eligible voters as to deter them from (re)enrolling. This is of particular significance in light of recent knife-edge election results in Queensland where one seat has determined the fate of government. ... The committee recognises that the 'degree' of deterrent effect of requiring the production of proof of identity documents as a condition of enrolment will depend on the identity documents actually specified in the finalised regulations. However, the deterrent effect will be exacerbated in cases where eligible electors do not already have proof of identity and it will cost them to obtain it. Effectively imposing payment as a pre-condition to the right to vote is antithetical to our democratic system of government. Given that most first-time voters are likely to be 18 year-olds, the new requirements have the potential to further exacerbate existing difficulties in encouraging young people to enrol. (AEC research shows that under current enrolment procedures, only 69% of eligible 18 year-old Australians are enrolled to vote with the figure for 19 year-olds being only slightly better at 78%.30 ) Depending on their final form, the regulations also have the potential to make it more difficult for other groups in the community to enrol. For example, if cost is involved (due to people having to obtain proof of identity documents) then low income earners are likely to be adversely affected. If access to a prescribed witness is difficult ... the impact will more likely be felt by people in rural or remote areas, a concern of particular relevance to a state the size of Queensland. ... 29 LCARC report no 19, n 18. 30 Hallett B, (Director Information, AEC), 'Youth participation in Australia', paper presented at the International IDEA's 1999 Democracy forum—Youth and democracy, Stockholm, June 1999 at 7..The prevention of electoral fraud 12 Queensland is not the only state concerned by the new enrolment requirements' potential to disenfranchise eligible electors. In this context, the new requirements have been described as 'voluntary voting by stealth'.31 ... ... The committee believes that, if electoral fraud is considered to be a real problem, then more effective strategies can be implemented to overcome such activity. A better and more proportionate means of addressing electoral fraud might be to increase the penalties for existing electoral offences.32 ... A second and more potent approach is enhanced continuous roll updating (CRU) with appropriate back-up and audit. ... Rather than new enrolment requirements such as the Commonwealth Parliament has passed the committee would prefer to see effort directed to increasing current enrolment levels by other means. ... In other words, the committee is interested in pursuing avenues that achieve higher enrolment, not ones that will lessen it. ... Committee conclusion 1 ... The new enrolment requirements have the potential to effectively disenfranchise a significant number of eligible voters. This result would make it essential for Queensland to retain its enrolment criteria as they stood prior to the October 1999 Commonwealth amendments (which have not yet commenced). In practical terms, this would mean that Queensland should (re)establish a separate state electoral roll. This, in the committee's opinion, would be a necessary but undesirable outcome. If electoral fraud is a problem, it should be addressed through a cooperative approach between the Commonwealth and the states. Such cooperative approach might include an enhanced continuous roll updating system with appropriate back-up and audit. Rather than the new Commonwealth enrolment requirements, the committee would prefer to see measures in place to increase the quality of the electoral roll and level of enrolment via a cooperative approach between the Commonwealth and the states. Committee recommendation 1 The committee recommends that the Queensland Attorney-General—as the minister responsible for the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld)—facilitate a meeting with the federal minister responsible for electoral matters in order to: ·alert the federal minister to the above-mentioned conclusions of this multi-party committee; and ·foreshadow the possibility that, if the enfranchisement of Queenslanders is threatened, then Queensland will consider: 31 Contractor A, 'ACT set to adopt tougher electoral processes', The Canberra Times, 3 December 1999 available at: . 32 See, for example, the following provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918: (a) s 44 (Forging or uttering electoral papers), penalty: $1000 or 6 months imprisonment or both; (b) s 39 (Other offences relating to ballot-papers etc) which makes it an offence to, among other things: make any false or misleading statement in an enrolment claim card, penalty—imprisonment for 6 months; impersonate anyone for the purposes of obtaining a ballot paper and voting, penalty—imprisonment for 6 months; voting more than once at the same election, penalty—10 penalty units; and (c) s 342 (Duty of witness to claim), penalty—$1000..The prevention of electoral fraud 13 (a) amending the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) to ensure enrolment criteria, as they stood prior to the October 1999 Commonwealth amendments (which have not yet commenced), are retained for state elections; and (b) (re)establishing its own electoral roll.33 In his 'Ministerial response' to the above recommendation, the Attorney-General, the Hon Matt Foley MP, stated that 'The recommendation has been adopted and implemented ...' 34 2.6 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTORAL MATTERS The committee stated in its issues paper that, whilst information contained in the paper might reflect a focus on State elections (that is, elections for a member or members of the Legislative Assembly), the committee equally welcomed submissions concerning local government elections (and aboriginal and island council elections). 2.6.1 Concurrent review of local government electoral matters The committee also noted in its issues paper that in June 2000 the Department of Communication and Information, Local Government, Planning and Sport (DCILGPS) released a discussion paper, Review of local government electoral arrangements in the Local Government Act 1993. The DCILGPS discussion paper outlined information about, and invited submissions on, local government electoral arrangements, such as the role of the ECQ in local government elections. Submissions to that discussion paper closed on 6 October 2000. The discussion paper indicated that the department would undertake a further round of public consultation once the Minister released consequent firm reform proposals. The DCILGPS discussion paper also stated that the department (as it does after each local government election) had written to local governments seeking advice on any amendments to electoral procedures that are considered necessary to overcome any practical problems or issues encountered during the March 2000 local government elections. 2.6.2 Local government electoral matters in this report The proper administration of local government and aboriginal and island council elections are obviously as important as the proper administration of state elections. Also, the issues raised by this inquiry have equal application to all elections where the electoral roll is used, with certain exceptions where local government and aboriginal and island council electoral processes are idiosyncratic (eg certain first-past-the-post local government polls; tighter communities in aboriginal and island council elections).35 However, the committee has not had the time or resources to specifically research such matters. Furthermore, as indicated by Local Government Services,36 local government 33 LCARC report no 19, n 18 at 11-12, 14 and 24-27. These comments relate to the identity requirements; the amendments also introduced new witnessing requirements. Readers should refer to the actual report, available via the committee website, for the comment's full comments. 34 Hon M Foley MP, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice and Minister for The Arts, 'ministerial response' to LCARC report no 19, tabled on 1 June 2000. 35 The committee received 10 submissions from local governments and comments made in those submissions from local governments are referred to in the report. 36 Department of Communication and Information, Local Government, Planning and Sport (Local Government Services) response dated 18 October 2000 to LCARC's request for information..The prevention of electoral fraud 14 electoral arrangements tend to be based—as applicable—on State-level electoral policy decisions that are reflected in the provisions contained in the Electoral Act. On that basis, for the remainder of this report, the committee mostly does not further delineate between local government, aboriginal and island council and state elections. Of course, any recommendations specifically about enhancing existing enrolment procedures will consequently directly affect State, local government and aboriginal and island council elections, as they are all based on the same electoral roll..The prevention of electoral fraud 15 3. NATURE OF THE INQUIRY, INITIAL CONCLUSIONS AND CONTENT OF THE REPORT 3.1 NATURE OF THE INQUIRY This inquiry has been a challenging one for the committee. The subject matter of the inquiry—the prevention of electoral fraud—is vitally important and requires thorough, informed consideration. The answer to the question that the Legislative Assembly has referred to the committee—what is 'the best way to minimise electoral fraud at elections'?— requires consideration of the nature of our democracy, and of the features of the electoral process at its heart. It requires an assessment of how well the current electoral system is faring, and a weighing up of current arrangements with the broad reform options that are suggested from time to time.37 The question also requires consideration about how the current electoral system should be adjudged, and about how the merits and suitability of reform options should be measured against current arrangements and desired outcomes. Fundamentally, the electoral system must provide electors with maximum opportunity to cast their vote. Undue hurdles to the franchise are anathema to our democratic process. This is especially so in Australia where both enrolment and voting are compulsory. At the same time, all possible steps must be taken to prevent electoral malpractice and fraud in order to optimise the electoral effect of each vote and to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system. The legitimacy of the entire political process stems from legitimate electoral results. The short timeframe given by the Assembly to the committee in which to report has heightened the challenge of the inquiry. Nevertheless, the committee welcomes the opportunity that this report presents to the committee to place a good deal of valuable information about electoral matters into the public arena,38 in the form of references to information and opinions contained in submissions received by the committee and the transcript of the committee's hearing. However, it is the existence of the two concurrent and ongoing inquiries mentioned in the previous chapter—the CJC's Shepherdson inquiry into certain allegations of electoral fraud in Queensland and the JSCEM's inquiry into the integrity of the electoral roll and incidents of electoral fraud—that has most accentuated the difficulty of the committee's task. Since the outset of its inquiry, the committee has been mindful, and concerned, that its reporting date of 14 November 2000 would precede the likely reporting dates of both the Shepherdson inquiry and the JSCEM inquiry. Indeed, during the process of preparing this report, news items on radio and television and in newspapers have appeared almost daily about: ·the information presented to the Shepherdson inquiry's hearings; and ·other well-publicised allegations of past electoral fraud. That information and those allegations are obviously very serious. 37 Various electoral reform options are outlined in the latter parts of chapters 6-8 below. 38 Electoral law and policy is an area that, for various reasons, has traditionally suffered from a lack of information compared to other areas of public importance..The prevention of electoral fraud 16 Nonetheless, this committee, as signalled in the committee's issues paper, has not attempted to investigate specific allegations of past instances of electoral fraud. Instead, the committee intended that is inquiry be forward looking in nature—an inquiry about matters of electoral law reform, with the following two broad subcategories: ·matters relating to the possible reform of voting procedures to enhance, if necessary, the integrity of the voting process at Queensland State elections, local government and aboriginal and island council elections; and ·matters relating to the possible reform of enrolment procedures to enhance, if necessary, the integrity of the electoral roll. It is the second broad subcategory of electoral matters that make up this inquiry—that is, enrolment arrangements—that is concurrently being inquired into by the Shepherdson and JSCEM inquires. Unlike this inquiry, those inquiries are undertaking in-depth investigation of allegations of specific past instances of enrolment fraud. Apart from various AEC investigations that follow elections, the Shepherdson inquiry appears to be the most thorough and best resourced investigation of possible instances of enrolment fraud in recent Australian history, despite the focus in the inquiry's terms of reference on enrolment fraud relevant to the conduct of internal political party (ie ALP) plebiscites for preselection of candidates for certain Queensland state and local government elections. (ALP party rules dictate that a party member's ability to vote in a particular branch's contest for preselection depends upon that member being enrolled to vote at an address within that branch's district.39 ) The JSCEM inquiry's terms of reference indicate that that parliamentary committee will be investigating allegations of specific incidents of enrolment fraud. It is unclear at this stage where the JSCEM's inquiries will lead it, but the outcome of the JSCEM inquiry will also be important to the consideration of the integrity of the electoral roll. In this regard, it has been particularly frustrating to the committee not to have been able to duly consider the AEC's submission to the JSCEM inquiry. That submission was released by the JSCEM on 31 October 2000, 40 a time during which the committee was already considering the Chair's draft report. This committee always expected the AEC submission to the JSCEM to contain vital information about the integrity of the roll and current continuous roll updating activities undertaken by the AEC, activities which have only recently been developed and about which there is only limited information available.41 So, this committee has been faced with two major concurrent but unfinished inquiries concentrating on the actual incidence of irregular or fraudulent enrolment activity. Both inquiries will presumably shed light on the integrity of the electoral roll and consequently how much—and what—might need to be done, if anything, to prevent and detect enrolment fraud in the future. 39 Mr Mike Kaiser MP outlined changes made during the 1990s to ALP preselection rules in the Legislative Assembly on 4 October 2000, Hansard, Queensland Legislative Assembly, 4 October 2000 at 3469-3470. 40 During the first sitting week of the Commonwealth Parliament since submissions to the JSCEM closed on 13 October 2000. 41 The AEC nevertheless provided valuable information about such matters to the committee during the committee's hearing..The prevention of electoral fraud 17 3.1.1 Conclusions about the integrity of the roll and the need for reforming enrolment procedures In order to make comprehensive recommendations about the necessity for—and the form of—reform of existing enrolment laws and procedures, this committee needed, of course, to come to an assessment of the effectiveness of those laws and practices based on all available evidence. Because the Shepherdson and JSCEM inquiries are still in progress, the committee considers that it does not have all available (or soon to be available) evidence. Accordingly, the committee is reticent about coming to conclusions about the integrity of the electoral roll and, in particular, the level of enrolment fraud. The committee therefore in this report does not make comprehensive or definitive: ·conclusions about the integrity of the electoral roll; ·conclusions about the effectiveness of enrolment laws and practices; or ·recommendations for the reform of enrolment laws and procedures aimed at ensuring the integrity of the roll, except for the important recommendations contained in chapter 9 and referred to in section 3.1.2 below. The committee's caution about making conclusions about the integrity of the roll because of the existence of the current Shepherdson and JSCEM inquiries should not be interpreted as an indication that the committee has no confidence in the integrity of the roll. It must be remembered that many authoritative Australian electoral bodies have over many years given sound assurances based on the evidence before them that the electoral (including enrolment) system is in good shape.42 Those assessments should not, and will not, be displaced lightly. 3.1.2 Conclusions about the integrity of the voting process and the need for reforming polling procedures The consideration of questions of the possible reform of voting laws and procedures to some extent also depends on an assessment of the integrity of the roll and the effectiveness of procedures surrounding enrolment. This is because some forms of possible voting fraud are predicated on prior fraudulent enrolment activity. To that extent, whilst the committee above (and throughout this report) makes a distinction between enrolment fraud and voting fraud, the distinction is somewhat artificial. Apart from the two current (Shepherdson and JSCEM) inquiries, the committee has considered much valuable information about the incidence or otherwise of electoral fraud (voting and enrolment fraud) contained in: submissions to the committee; views presented at the committee's hearing; previously published submissions of the AEC to the JSCEM; JSCEM reports; and various other publications. The information provided to this committee in submissions and during the committee's hearing does not suggest to the committee that there is a general problem of widespread electoral fraud, in terms of voting fraud or enrolment fraud. Indeed, the evidence before the committee suggests quite the opposite in relation to voting fraud—the evidence before this committee suggests that: ·existing arrangements for the actual conduct of elections are generally adequate to ensure the integrity of the voting process; and 42 Those views are outlined below in section 5.2..The prevention of electoral fraud 18 ·should it otherwise be the case in the future, there are sufficient checks and balances in place (outlined later in this report) to ensure that fraudulent behaviour surrounding the casting and counting of votes would, if sufficient to affect the electoral result of any particular electorate, be detected and dealt with. In particular, no submission to this committee questioned the capacity generally of the ECQ to conduct elections in a free, fair and honest manner or to ensure the integrity of polling procedures. In fact, various submitters to this committee made explicit their confidence in the ECQ. Nevertheless, again in view of the fact that the committee feels it does not have all the potential evidence before it (in light of the on-going Shepherdson inquiry), the committee in this report does not make any comprehensive or definitive: ·conclusions about the effectiveness or otherwise of voting laws and practices; or ·recommendations for the reform of voting laws and procedures aimed at ensuring the integrity of the roll (except to the extent indicated below in this chapter). 3.1.3 Nature of this report As indicated by the above discussion, the committee intends this report as an interim report to Parliament in response to the Parliament's 22 August 2000 reference to the committee to inquire into the prevention of electoral fraud. The committee in this report concentrates on providing Queensland electors with information about the checks and balances that are in place to protect the electoral process from fraud. The committee does so to inform public debate. The report also summarises the various views expressed to the committee about the effectiveness of the various checks and balances and about possible reform proposals. Nevertheless, the committee does make some important positive recommendations in chapter 9 (The way forward—a separate State-based enrolment verification system) of this report about measures it considers important to implement now, regardless of what the Shepherdson and JSCEM inquiries ultimately report. The committee looks forward to finalising its consideration of matters raised by this inquiry at a later time, after Hon Shepherdson—and, for that matter, the JSCEM—has reported on alleged incidents of electoral (enrolment) fraud. The committee makes those recommendations with the following matters in mind: ·the Parliament asked the committee to report to it by 14 November 2000 on ways of preventing electoral fraud so that attempts could be made to introduce any necessary measures before the conduct of the next general State election (due mid-2001); and ·regardless of what the Shepherdson inquiry might ultimately find in terms of illegal activity or misconduct—and regardless of what that inquiry might specifically recommend (if anything or if necessary) to prevent the recurrence of any such illegalities or irregularities—the media and political attention surrounding the Shepherdson inquiry has the potential to substantially erode public confidence in the electoral process..The prevention of electoral fraud 19 3.2 OVERVIEW OF REMAINDER OF REPORT In its issues paper the committee said that it welcomed the opportunity that the inquiry presented the committee to: ·address public concerns about electoral fraud; and ·make recommendations addressing those concerns and/or provide factual information to (where possible) allay those concerns. Accordingly, in chapter 4 (Existing checks and balances in the electoral process) the committee provides extensive information about the existing checks and balances within the electoral system that are designed to ensure the system's integrity and prevent electoral fraud. The information in chapter 4 is mainly descriptive of existing arrangements. In chapter 5 (The electoral system generally—effectiveness), the committee examines the forms of electoral fraud and the capacity of the electoral system generally to prevent those forms of fraud. The committee also: outlines previously stated views of various electoral authorities about allegations of fraudulent electoral practices; and summarises the views expressed to the committee about the effectiveness of the electoral system generally. In chapter 6 ('Global' checks and balances—effectiveness and options), the committee summarises comments made to the committee (in submissions and at the hearing) about the effectiveness of certain 'global' checks and balances; namely, an independent electoral commission, the Court of Disputed Returns and electoral offence provisions. The committee also summarises views expressed to it about reform options that relate to those global checks. In chapter 7 (Voting procedures— effectiveness and options), the committee outlines: ·comments made to the committee about the effectiveness of existing polling procedures in preventing voting fraud; and ·reform options pertaining to voting arrangements, and the comments made to the committee about such options. As indicated above, the committee does not make definitive conclusions about whether reform is necessary in relation to voting processes or about the desirability of particular reform options (eg requiring proof of voter identity on election day). The committee instead leaves all reform options open for its reconsideration at a later time (ie after Hon Shepherdson reports). In chapter 8 (Enrolment procedures—effectiveness and options), the committee outlines: ·comments made to the committee about the effectiveness of existing enrolment procedures in preventing enrolment fraud; and ·reform options pertaining to enrolment arrangements, and the comments made to the committee about such options. Again, the committee does not make definitive conclusions, except that it leaves open the way for certain recommendations it makes later in chapter 9. Otherwise, the committee again leaves all reform options open for its reconsideration at a later time. Finally, in chapter 9 (The way forward—a separate state-based enrolment verification system) the committee recommends that Queensland create a State-based enrolment verification system capable of processing and interrogating a range of name and address data from State databases in order to greatly enhance the capacity of electoral authorities to prevent electoral fraud..The prevention of electoral fraud 20 4. EXISTING CHECKS AND BALANCES IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 4.1 INTRODUCTION—QUEENSLAND'S ELECTORAL SYSTEM Free, honest and fair elections conducted using a true and accurate roll are the cornerstone of our democracy. The Fitzgerald report 43 identified this, stating that: A fundamental tenet of the established system of parliamentary democracy is that public opinion is given effect by regular, free, fair elections following open debate. A government in our political system which achieves office by means other than free and fair elections lacks legitimate political authority over that system ... The Elections Act 1983-85 should ... be reviewed in an impartial manner to ensure that more effective means are developed to guarantee the accuracy of electoral rolls, to prevent fraudulent voting practices and to maintain the confidentiality of individual voters, particularly in the case of absentee and postal voters. ... the inquiry [by EARC] must be totally open with public access to the evidence and submissions received by it ... 44 The former Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC), as required by legislation enacted by the Queensland Parliament after the Fitzgerald report, published various reports that dealt with the proper conduct of elections in Queensland. EARC's electoral reports included reports on: ·The local authority electoral system of Queensland, September 1990; ·Queensland joint electoral roll review, October 1990; ·Queensland Legislative Assembly electoral system, vols 1 & 2, November 1990, in which EARC addressed the proper setting of electoral boundaries in Queensland; ·Review of the Elections Act 1983-1991 and related matters, vols 1 & 2, December 1991; and ·Report on investigation of public registration of political donations, public funding of election campaigns and related issues, June 1992. It is from the thorough research and extensive public input reflected in EARC's comprehensive reports that Queensland obtained its current electoral system. Queensland's Electoral Act 1992 is based on a draft Electoral Bill that EARC attached to its Report on the Review of the Elections Act 1983-1991 and related matters. Queensland's Electoral Act also incorporated comments made by the former Parliamentary Committee for Electoral and Administrative Review, which had the task of reviewing all EARC reports. Queensland's Electoral Act sets out the arrangements for State elections and establishes an independent statutory authority, the ECQ. 43 Fitzgerald GE, Report of the commission of inquiry into possible illegal activities and associated police misconduct, GoPrint, Brisbane, 1989. 44 Fitzgerald report, n 43 at 127..The prevention of electoral fraud 21 The committee observes that Queensland's electoral system is considered to be amongst the best in Australia, and that Australia's electoral systems are considered to be amongst the best in the world. Queensland's electoral legislation is founded upon EARC's considered approach of attempting to ensure integrity without being overly prescriptive: Queensland's electoral system is essentially based on an elector's civic obligation of trust at first instance, within a finely-tuned system of various checks and balances.45 It is fair to describe Queensland's electoral system as not only a system of trust but also as 'elector-friendly'. At the same time, there exist important safeguards that are aimed at ensuring the integrity of the electoral system, largely by providing transparency to the electoral process—for example: a publicly accessible electoral roll, the entries on which can be objected to; the right of scrutineers to be present during polling and vote counting. The checks and balances that make up the electoral system arise from the following principles, which EARC laid down as the proper basis for an electoral system and the ECQ subsequently adopted as its on-going charter.46 PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM Free and Democratic Electoral Events 1. Electors must have only one vote; the ballot must be secret. 2. Electors must be free to cast their votes without coercion or improper influence. 3. The rights both to vote and be a candidate must be preserved. 4. Electors must be provided with maximum opportunity to cast their votes. 5. Electors must have access to information and assistance to aid them in selecting candidates and casting votes. 6. Ballot papers must be admitted to the count where the voters' intentions are clear. 7. Once admitted to the scrutiny, each elector's vote must be accurately counted. 8. The rights of candidates to be represented at polling and at the scrutiny, and to promote their candidacy must be protected. Legitimacy 9. Electoral legislation and procedures must be open and regularly reviewed in the light of changing community expectations so that public confidence in the integrity of the electoral system and outcomes can be maintained. 10. Electoral officials must be politically neutral and the conduct and administration of electoral events must never be influenced by political considerations. 11. Electoral officials must have a level of competency sufficient to command the respect of voters. 12. All possible steps must be taken to eliminate electoral malpractice and fraud. 13. Political parties play an important part in the election process, and their place in the electoral system should be recognised. 45 In this regard, EARC considered but rejected certain electoral proposals that had been made to it that EARC considered as too restrictive a barrier to electors optimally effecting their franchise. Proposals that were rejected by EARC are among the various options for reform listed in chapters 7 and 8 of this report. 46 EARC, Report on review of the Elections Act 1983-1991 and related matters, GoPrint, Brisbane, December 1991 at 7-10, as paraphrased in ECQ, Annual Report 1999-2000, GoPrint, Brisbane, October 2000 at 4..The prevention of electoral fraud 22 14. Judicial and administrative review procedures should be available to all candidates and electors who wish to query or dispute the conduct or outcome of an electoral event. A Simple Voting System 15. Procedures at polling booths must be simple and straightforward. 16. There should be the maximum level of compatibility possible between ballot paper marking methods in federal, State and local government electoral systems. 17. Administrative procedures must be efficient and cost-effective. 18. Election results must be made available without delay. The committee notes that a number of these principles go to the core of this inquiry into preventing electoral fraud. The committee also notes that there is a certain potential tension between various principles. For example, the principle that all possible steps must be taken to eliminate electoral malpractice and fraud (principle 12 above) needs to be balanced with the principle that electors must be provided with maximum opportunity to cast their votes (principle 4). In this regard, the committee considers that it is important to consider any proposals for the prevention of electoral fraud from a perspective that concurrently identifies the need to ensure that as many electors as possible access their right to enrol and are given the opportunity to vote. In addition, certain reform proposals that are directed at principle 12 (eliminating electoral fraud) can also undesirably displace principles 15 (procedures at polling booths must be straightforward), 17 (administrative procedures must be efficient and cost-effective) and 18 (election results must be made available without delay). In the remainder of this chapter, the committee describes the various checks and balances that exist within Queensland's electoral system to ensure its freedom, fairness and honesty. The checks and balances in place are aimed at guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process generally and, specifically, are aimed at deterring, detecting and responding to electoral fraud. The comments below are descriptive; views about the effectiveness of the checks and balances that have been presented to the committee during the course of this inquiry are presented in chapters 5 - 8. 4.2 'GLOBAL' CHECKS AND BALANCES It is useful to first outline the various checks and balances that exist in a 'global' sense in Queensland's electoral system. In some regards, they are the most important safeguards because they protect the entire system and act as ultimate insurance against electoral irregularities. These global electoral checks and balances are as follows. 4.2.1 An independent electoral commission The Electoral Act 1992 establishes the ECQ as an independent statutory authority, headed by an independent electoral commissioner. This is a fundamental safeguard in the system—an electoral body independent from government, political parties and dominant political forces. The ECQ's functions and powers include: (a) Preparing for and conducting parliamentary elections, by-elections and referendums; (b) Conducting elections and amalgamation ballots for industrial unions of employers and employees;.The prevention of electoral fraud 23 (c) Administering the party registration, funding and disclosure provisions of the Electoral Act 1992; (d) Reviewing the external boundaries and electoral arrangements for local governments; (e) Assisting in the maintenance and monitoring of the accuracy of the Commonwealth-State joint electoral roll; (f) Providing research and operational support services to State Redistribution Commissions on appointment; (g) Promoting enrolment, voting and public awareness of electoral matters by conducting information and awareness campaigns and providing educational material; (h) Conducting research into electoral matters, and providing information and advice on electoral issues to the Minister and Government, the Legislative Assembly, and government departments and agencies; (i) Publishing material relating to the Commission's functions including monthly enrolment statistics, election, by-election and referendum results, and the results of research on electoral matters; and (j) Conducting elections for local governments as authorised by legislation.47 The ECQ's mission statement 48 is to maintain the integrity of Queensland's electoral system. 4.2.2 Disputing electoral results—The Court of Disputed Returns A further fundamental safeguard in Queensland's electoral system is the capacity of the ECQ (or of unsuccessful candidates and persons qualified to vote in the relevant election) to dispute an election by challenging the result in the Court of Disputed Returns if the commission (or candidate or elector) considers that instances of fraudulent or irregular enrolment or voting have been sufficient to affect a result for an electoral district. The ECQ considers that it has a clear statutory obligation to place an election result before the Court of Disputed Returns if there is any doubt in the circumstances that an election does not have a clear result. In relation to local government electoral arrangements, the Department of Communication and Information, Local Government, Planning and Sport (Local Government Services; hereafter 'LGS') in its response to the committee's request for information stated: Local Government 1993, Section 223- Provides for a review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 of the lawfulness of an election or appointment of a councillor, or the continued eligibility of a person to act as a councillor. Subsection (2) provides that any 'elector” of the local government may make an application under the section. However, subsection (3) provides that subsection (2) does not limit the persons who can make the application . 49 4.2.3 Monitoring and review After each State election, the ECQ consults with returning officers and reviews the commission's processes. The ECQ subsequently provides a report to the Queensland 47 Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), s 8, as paraphrased in ECQ, Annual Report 1999-2000, n 46 at 3. 48 ECQ annual report, n 46 at 5. 49 LGS response, n 36..The prevention of electoral fraud 24 Attorney-General containing recommendations for amendments to Queensland's Electoral Act that the ECQ considers warranted in light of the conduct of the election. This committee has previously reported on such recommendations made by the ECQ and/or amendments to the Electoral Act consequently proposed by the Attorney-General.50 The ECQ considers its review processes as important, not only for addressing 'nuts and bolts' procedural difficulties that might arise during the conduct of elections but also for addressing concerns that are raised about alleged irregularities and electoral integrity issues. The Electoral Commissioner commented on the review undertaken after every election. The Electoral Commissioner informed the committee: We do our own review after every election—a very detailed review. We engage a management consultant and a Treasury official. We have no part in it ourselves. Independently of the commission, they contact all the candidates, all the political parties, all the players, all the media and ask, "What were the problems?" I have never had a problem presented to me in relation to voting fraud or technical problems with voting. After each federal election, there is a formal process whereby the incoming government establishes a Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters of the Commonwealth Parliament (see section 2.2 above) and provides it with a reference to inquire into and report on that election.51 Subsequently, the JSCEM publishes a comprehensive report following public consultation by way of submissions and public hearings. The reports include discussion of the AEC's roll-keeping and also contain various recommendations for the amendment of the Commonwealth Electoral Act. The ECQ monitors JSCEM recommendations (and any changes to the Commonwealth Electoral Act) to assess the appropriateness of those changes for Queensland. This committee also continues to monitor electoral matters (in line with one of its key responsibilities, namely, electoral reform including monitoring generally the conduct of elections under Queensland's Electoral Act). This committee has published reports on a variety of electoral issues.52 50 See: LCARC reports no 2, Report on matters pertaining to the Electoral Commission of Queensland, GoPrint, Brisbane, August 1996; report no 5, Report on the Electoral Amendment Bill 1996, GoPrint, Brisbane, March 1997; report no 19, n 18; and report no 23, n 3. A case that reflects how potential irregular activity is identified and addressed by the ECQ through its reviews is referred to in LCARC report no 23, n 3 at 7-10. That report describes an ECQ proposal to address past allegations that persons in charge of declared institutions (nursing homes, hospitals etc) have previously selectively distributed how-to-vote material to residents. 51 There is no such formal process, or legislation, in Queensland that refers each election to a parliamentary committee such as LCARC. 52 See LCARC reports no 2, n 50; report no 3, Review of the Referendums Bill 1996, GoPrint, Brisbane, November 1996; report no 4, n 5; report no 5, n 50, report no 18, n 4; report no 19, n 18; report no 20, n 5 and report no 23, n 3; as available at the committee's website provided at the front of this report..The prevention of electoral fraud 25 4.2.4 Enrolment and voting offences and their enforcement Offences covering fraudulent electoral activity are contained in the Commonwealth Electoral Act (Part XXI), Queensland's Electoral Act (Part 9), the Commonwealth Crimes Act 1914 (Part V) and the Queensland Criminal Code (Chapter 46). Electoral offences serve to deter and punish enrolment and voting fraud (as well as other types of behaviour concerning elections not discussed in this report).53 Offence provisions relating to voting and enrolment fraud include: Voting ·voting more than once; ·voting when not entitled; ·personation; and ·making a false declaration. Enrolment ·forging or uttering electoral papers, in particular the AEC enrolment card; ·entering a false name on the electoral roll; ·making the signature of another person; and ·falsely witnessing documents. The process for prosecution of an electoral offence usually involves initial detection of an irregularity by the ECQ (for voting offences) or the AEC (for enrolment offences) through routine checks (discussed below) or from a complaint to either of these bodies from another source. The matter is then referred to the police (Australian Federal Police for enrolment irregularities; Queensland Police Service for voting irregularities) for investigation and possible prosecution.54 During the committee's hearing for this inquiry, the AEC outlined various investigative and prosecutorial matters that have previously been referred by it to the federal police, including the Ehrmann, Kehoe and Foster matters in Townsville.55 In relation to local government electoral arrangements, LGS informed the committee that: Section 407 provides that an application may be made to the Supreme Court for an injunction if a person has, is or proposes to engage in conduct that would constitute a contravention or an offence under Chapter 5 of the Act. An application may be made by a returning officer or a candidate or nominee as candidate for an election. A returning officer may also make an application under the section if he/she decides a person is not properly nominated for an election. ... Any person who becomes aware of electoral fraud and has evidence to that effect, may lodge a complaint with the Magistrates Court. The Magistrate would proceed to hear the complaint pursuant to the procedures laid down by the Justices Act 1886.56 53 For example, bribery, misleading voters, offences relating to advertising. 54 See ECQ submission (no 11), n 10 at 2 and 56-57. As to the demarcation between the Australian Federal Police investigating federal (enrolment) offences and the Queensland Police Service investigating State (voting and other) offences, see the transcript of the committee's hearing of 24 October 2000 (hereafter 'Transcript') at 20. 55 See, for example, Transcript, n 54 at 10, 13 and 16..The prevention of electoral fraud 26 In relation to aboriginal and island council electoral arrangements, the Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy and Development (hereafter 'DATSIPD') informed to the committee: Returning officers are advised to inform the Electoral Commission of Queensland of any allegations or instances of enrolment fraud as alleged/detected by the public or themselves. The Department does not investigate any complaints itself. Voting fraud has not been an identified issue.57 4.3 ENROLMENT CHECKS AND BALANCES Whilst it is voting safeguards (outlined in section 4.4) that people first think of when considering the issue of electoral fraud, it is accurate and true electoral rolls that provide the foundation for honest and fair elections, and the highest standards should exist in their preparation and maintenance.58 As the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) stated in its Report on the review of the Elections Act 1983-1991 and related matters: Electoral rolls are a fundamental component of any voting system. Rolls constitute the official list of electors and are prima facie evidence of electors' right to vote. Enrolment procedures therefore need to strike the right balance between the need to be rigorous to ensure integrity of the rolls, and the need for flexibility to ensure that peoples' rights to enrol and vote are protected.59 Inaccurate rolls reflect adversely on the legitimacy of any election founded on those rolls. As the Liberal Party of Australia stated in its submission to the Commonwealth Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters' inquiry into resource sharing in the conduct of elections: The greatest concern the Liberal Party has regarding the administration of elections in Australia is the maintenance and integrity of the Commonwealth, State, Territory and Local Government electoral rolls. It is essential that the highest standards are maintained to ensure the integrity of electoral rolls. Accurate electoral rolls are necessary to safeguard public confidence in the democratic process and importantly, given the recent trends for state and federal elections to be determined by close margins in a small number of seats, they are essential for ensuring that the democratic wishes of the voters are not corrupted.60 56 LGS response, n 36. 57 Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy and Development (DATSIPD) response dated 6 October 2000 to LCARC's request for information. 58 As previously expressed by the Queensland Electoral Commissioner, Mr Des O'Shea, in a letter to LCARC dated 25 October 1999, as cited in LCARC, report no 23, n 3 at 40. 59 EARC report, n 46 at 46. 60 Submission by the Liberal Party of Australia to the JSCEM's Inquiry into resource sharing in the conduct of elections, December 1991 at 4.1-4.2, as cited in the ECQ's submission to the LCARC 1997 privacy inquiry: ECQ, July 1997 at 2..The prevention of electoral fraud 27 As outlined in section 5.1 of this report, perhaps the most critical evidence provided by the Electoral Commissioner to the committee during the inquiry was as follows. Whilst multiple voting (dual or multiple voting in one person's name) can be adequately detected through the post-election scanning of multiple marks on the certified lists,61 there is little that can be done at election time to detect other potent forms of electoral fraud: ·personation (real people voting in others'/fictitious names); and ·people deceitfully enrolling at an address for which they are not entitled and subsequently voting in the poll for the electorate containing that address. These forms of potential fraudulent activity must be addressed at enrolment, an issue revisited later in this report. 4.3.1 Overview of Queensland's enrolment arrangements Whilst Queensland's Electoral Act requires the ECQ to keep an electoral roll for each of Queensland's electoral districts,62 Queensland does not maintain its own electoral roll. Rather, the Commonwealth electoral authority, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), maintains—with ECQ input—the Queensland state roll (which is also used for local government elections and jury districts). This is in accordance with a joint roll arrangement between the Commonwealth and Queensland, such an arrangement being permitted by the Electoral Act 1992, s 62. Pursuant to this joint roll arrangement, completed joint enrolment cards are processed into the AEC's Roll Management System (RMANS) by AEC divisional staff. State roll data is then extracted from RMANS and provided to the ECQ. The joint roll procedure is based on almost identical eligibility criteria, a common enrolment form and the single entry into RMANS of enrolments. However, the Queensland and Commonwealth rolls are separate documents. While RMANS is a national enrolment system, its operation for Queensland purposes is subject to monitoring by a Joint Roll Management Committee constituted by the Queensland Electoral Commissioner (or nominee) and the Australian Electoral Officer (or nominee).63 Day to day issues are handled by AEC and ECQ liaison officers. These 'joint roll' arrangements have existed since 1992 following a recommendation of the former Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (EARC) which was endorsed by EARC's parliamentary committee, the Parliamentary Committee for Administrative and Electoral Review. After considering the arguments for and against adopting a joint electoral roll, EARC concluded that a joint electoral roll (based on the recommendations in its report) was superior to retention of the then roll because it would provide: ·greater integrity of the roll database, and therefore greater public confidence in the legitimacy of electoral outcomes; ·significantly lower cost to the State (even allowing for Queensland's financial contribution to the maintenance of a joint electoral roll), with savings estimated to be about $1 million per annum; 61 The certified lists is the copy of the electoral roll used by polling officials on election day. 62 Electoral Act 1992, s 58. 63 The Joint Roll Management Committee is established pursuant to clause 16 of the joint roll arrangement..The prevention of electoral fraud 28 ·greater convenience to electors through uniform eligibility criteria; and ·capacity to support all state systems then provided by the state electoral roll as well as the retention of state input into the management of the roll through: (a) the joint roll management committee; (b) state on-line access to the database and capacity to raise objections to names on the roll; and (c) the state retaining responsibility for the updating of fields for state purposes.64 All other Australian states and territories also have joint roll arrangements with the AEC although the nature of these arrangements differs among the jurisdictions.65 For example, both Victoria and Western Australia maintain their own state roll but exchange enrolment data with the Commonwealth. During this inquiry, Mr Bob Longland, AEC, Australian Electoral Officer (Queensland) informed the committee about the respective responsibilities of the AEC and the ECQ in relation to the keeping of the electoral roll: There are two components to the joint roll arrangement, characterised as management of the roll and maintenance of the roll. Between Mr O'Shea [Queensland's Electoral Commissioner] and myself, I believe that we have absolutely no doubts about what those limits are. In terms of the management of the roll, we meet and discuss regularly issues related to how we proceed. Much of that discussion is informed by the work that we perform within the Electoral Council of Australia, which is a body consisting of the AEC and all the State and Territory commissioners or equivalents, where we look at the strategic management activities related to roll management and, of course, consequential issues that relate to election management. In terms of maintenance, however, the arrangement is very clear: the AEC collects all of the material that makes up the roll, processes it, and provides a range of products to the ECQ for the discharge of their responsibilities. In its simplest form, that is rolls for elections ... But the maintenance task is purely ours ... 66 The fundamental checks that exist to protect the integrity of the electoral roll are outlined below.67 4.3.2 Public availability of the electoral roll and the objection process The transparency that results from the public availability of the electoral roll is a fundamental reason for its integrity. Section 60 of the Electoral Act provides that the Commission must make available for inspection, to any person, without fee, a copy of the most recent printed version of the publicly available part of the roll at the office of the Commission and the office of each returning officer. Similar provisions exist in section 90 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act. 64 EARC report, Report on Queensland Joint Electoral Review, GoPrint, Brisbane, October 1990 at 7.4. 65 For further background and information regarding the various Commonwealth/state joint roll arrangements see the JSCEM report, The conduct of elections: New boundaries for cooperation, AGPS, Canberra, September 1992 at chapter 5 and EARC report, n 64 at 4.1-4.5. 66 Transcript, n 54 at 2. 67 The committee acknowledges that there have been other processes in place in the past which may have provided further integrity to the roll, but which, for various reasons, have been abandoned. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Electoral Information Service (ATSIEIS) was discussed as one now abandoned measure, the absence of which, it is argued, has led to a 'fall-off in indigenous enrolment': see Madigan, M, 'Black voting rights in turmoil', The Courier-Mail, 6 November 2000 at 2. Also see AEC supplementary submission to the JSCEM, 'Further AEC responses to other submissions and to hearings', 23 July 1999 at 49.2-49.5..The prevention of electoral fraud 29 The objection mechanism referred to below, and consequential deletions from the roll, add a further layer of integrity to the roll. As the ECQ submitted to the committee: The objection process is the means by which persons are removed from the electoral roll. In practice, most objection action is generated from a wide variety of information, which comes to the attention of the AEC. (For example, Members 'return to sender mail”; mail returned unclaimed from non voter processing; acknowledgment cards or any other mail out to electors which is returned unclaimed.) The Queensland Electoral Act 1992 also provides electors with the power to object to an enrolment (Section 67(1)). This provision is included in the Queensland legislation to provide a means of removing persons from the roll who are State electors only (i.e. certain British subjects who are eligible to be on the State roll but not the Federal roll). Section 67(8) of the Electoral Act 1992 also gives the Commissioner power to lodge objections under the Commonwealth Electoral Act. It has not been necessary to take this course of action, as all issues involving a person's eligibility to be enrolled have been resolved at Joint Management Meetings.68 At the committee hearing, Mr Longland outlined the three objection procedures: The first of them is a very important one but is very little understood and very rarely used. That is a citizen