Electoral fraud affects results: Parliamentary Committee --
‘Managing the roll’ (4)
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Parliament of Australia, Canberra
MANAGING THE ROLL 44
2.113 A majority of submissions, however, supported the implementation of the
enrolment provisions of the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act (No 1)
1999.
179
In response to an AEC request for comments from DROs on the
first AEC submission to the current inquiry, four DROs, out of the ten
DROs who responded, indicated their support for the new enrolment
provisions.
180
2.114 Dr Amy McGrath recommended the Commonwealth Government
override the concerns of the States and Territories about the
implementation of the enrolment provisions of the Electoral and Referendum
Amendment Act (No 1) 1999.
181
2.115 In order to alleviate public concerns about the potential for enrolment
fraud and restore public confidence in the integrity of the roll, the
committee supports the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Regulations
2000. The committee notes the various improvements by the AEC to
maintaining the integrity of the roll through the RMANS and the CRU
process and supports further enhancement of this process. The committee
believes the amended regulations assist the continuous audit of the roll
process by requiring more effective identity verification at the beginning
of the enrolment process.
2.116 The committee also encourages the States and Territories to co-operate
with the Commonwealth in implementing the amended regulations prior
to the next federal election and in maintaining the Joint Roll
Arrangements. Even if some States and Territories remain concerned with
the potential impact on the franchise of the amended regulations and
prefer to retain their enrolment criteria as it stood prior to the October
1999 Commonwealth amendments, which in effect would mean the
(re)establishment of separate State and Territory Electoral rolls, the
committee believes the Commonwealth should proceed with the
implementation of the amended regulations.
____________________________
179 Submissions p S357 (C.Reimer), p S362 (L.Hewett), p S368 (B.Kirkpatrick), p S394 (Liberal
Party), p S412 (A.McGrath), p S523 (G.Lucas), p S563 (M.Lamerton), p S575 (G.Smith), p S613
(A.McGrath), p S621 (J.Lloyd), p S650 (R.Patching), p S690 (K.Ehrmann), p S697 (P.Lindsay),
p S726 (E.Brooks Maher), and p S1144 (J.Olsen).
180 Submissions p S1112 (AEC).
181 Submissions p S615 (A.McGrath).
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/em/elecroll/chapter2.pdf
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Canberra
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MANAGING THE ROLL 45
Recommendation 4
2.117 That the States and Territories support the Electoral and Referendum
Amendment Regulations 2000 and the Commonwealth proceed to
implement the amended regulations in time for the next federal
election.
Should any State or Territory prefer to retain their enrolment criteria as
it stood prior to the October 1999 Commonwealth amendments and
(re)establish separate State or Territory Electoral Rolls, the
Commonwealth should proceed with the implementation of the
Electoral and Referendum Amendment Regulations 2000.
2.118 Professor Colin Hughes believes the existing identification measures are
adequate.
182
Professor Hughes believed that if the aim is to introduce
more effective identification measures 'to protect the integrity of the
electoral process', the amended enrolment provisions are merely 'halfway
measures' and that a more comprehensive photographic based
identification system would have to be implemented for both enrolment
and voting.
183
2.119 A number of witnesses and people making submissions have argued that
voters should be required to show some form of appropriate formal
identification at a polling place before they are provided with ballot
papers as a means of preventing fraud.
184
The AEC argued that while the
introduction of such a system is not impossible, it would have significant
start up and on-going costs, voter inconvenience, possible
disenfranchisement and possible delays in the delivery of election results
because of an increase in the level of declaration voting.
185
The committee
is of the opinion that with the implementation of the new enrolment
provisions, the introduction of voter identification is not warranted as a
measure to deter fraud.
2.120 The DROs for Berowra, Banks and Werriwa suggested an alternative to
voters showing some form of formal identification - the inclusion of date-of-
birth on the Certified Lists of Voters for elections.
186
The AEC noted
that the inclusion of date-of-birth and gender information on the Certified
____________________________
182 Submissions pp S678-S679 (C.Hughes).
183 Submissions pp S678-S679 (C.Hughes).
184 Transcript p 337 (P.Lindsay), Submissions p S1098 (AEC). For other support for this measure,
see also Submissions p S363 (L.F.Hewett), p S370 (B.Kirkpatrick), p S411 (P.Brun), and p S1063
(R.Johnston).
185 Submissions p S516 (AEC).
186 Submissions p S1112 (AEC).
MANAGING THE ROLL 46
Lists is 'technically feasible'.187 The AEC indicated it would conditionally
support the introduction of date-of-birth information on the Certified
Lists.188 The committee is of the view that the inclusion of the gender and
date-of-birth of electors on the Certified Lists would provide an instant
and improved check on identity when voting. The inclusion of this
additional information on the Certified Lists would enable polling officials
to easily verify the identity of electors if required.
Recommendation 5
2.121 That the gender and date-of-birth of electors be included on the
Certified Lists of Voters for elections.
Early close of rolls
2.122 The primary catalyst for enrolment is an electoral event. Section 155 of the
Electoral Act provides that the rolls for an election close seven days after
the issue of the writ. This statutory period was introduced following the
1983 election, when the rolls closed the day after the election was called.
During this seven-day period the AEC receives the largest number of
enrolments at any one time, 428,000 during the 1996 federal election and
351,913 during the 1998 federal election. Given the increased volume of
enrolments during this period and the limited time frame, the AEC has
admitted that detailed checking is 'virtually impossible'.189
Previous JSCEM federal election inquiry recommendations
2.123 In its reports on the conduct of the 1996 and 1998 federal elections the
committee expressed its concern with the potential impact on the integrity
of the roll of a large number of enrolments occurring during the seven-day
period and the AEC's inability to carry out detailed checking. In its 1998
Federal Election Inquiry Report the committee noted that between the
issue of the writs on 31 August 1998 and the close of rolls on 7 September
1998, the AEC received a total of 351,913 enrolment forms and that
____________________________
187 Submissions p S881 (AEC).
188 Submissions p S1112 (AEC).
189 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 1997. The 1996 Federal Election: Report of the
Inquiry into the conduct of the 1996 Federal Election and matters related thereto. Canberra, AGPS,
p 14.
MANAGING THE ROLL 47
processing of these forms was completed by 9 September 1998. 190 In
processing these forms the AEC admitted that:
There was checking done within the system that it is a legitimate
address, but in that close of Roll period there is no field checking
done.191
2.124 As part of the 1996 Federal Election Inquiry Report, the committee
recommended that the rolls for an election close to new electors on the
date of the issue of the writs, and for existing electors three days after the
issue of the writs.192 In response, the Government proposed an
amendment to the Electoral Act in the Electoral and Referendum Amendment
Act 1998 to make the close of the Roll three working days after the issue of
the writ. This amendment was rejected during the amending Act's
passage through the Senate. The committee made this recommendation
again in the 1998 Federal Election Inquiry Report. In its response to the
Report the Government supported this recommendation as 'the potential
for enrolment fraud at the time of the close of rolls is sufficiently high to
warrant this change'.193
Submissions to the current inquiry
2.125 The AEC noted that an early close of rolls:
would shut down a last-minute opportunity for electors to amend
their enrolments to secure their franchise, and for new enrollees,
particularly young people, to take up their franchise.194
Many electors will not keep their enrolments up-to-date at all
times, and it has long been recognised that many electors will not
attend to this legal requirement until it is absolutely necessary.195
The AEC also noted that no evidence has been produced to substantiate
claims of widespread and organised conspiracies to defraud the roll
____________________________
190 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 2000. The 1998 Federal Election: Report of the
Inquiry into the conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and matters related thereto. Canberra, CanPrint,
p 14.
191 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 2000. The 1998 Federal Election: Report of the
Inquiry into the conduct of the 1998 Federal Election and matters related thereto. Canberra, CanPrint,
p 14.
192 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 1997. The 1996 Federal Election: Report of the
Inquiry into the conduct of the 1996 Federal Election and matters related thereto. Canberra, AGPS,
p 14.
193 Government Response to Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters Report: The 1998
Federal Election. p 2.
194 Submissions p S515 (AEC).
195 Submissions p S515 (AEC).
MANAGING THE ROLL 48
during the close of rolls period.196 The AEC summarised its concerns
regarding an early close of rolls as follows:
— The AEC believes the emphasis in the committee's 1996 and 1998
federal election inquiry reports on the lack of field checking during the
close of rolls needs to be balanced by the ongoing improvements to the
accuracy of the rolls through the developments in the RMANS and
CRU processes and the absence of evidence of enrolment fraud during
the close of rolls period;
— The early close of rolls 'will not improve the accuracy of the rolls for an
election, simply because the need for field checking or any other kind of
checking will be eliminated', and the AEC expects the rolls to be less
accurate because there will be less time for existing electors to correct
their enrolments and for new enrolments to be received;
— The AEC expects an increase in the level of declaration voting which
would delay election results;
— The AEC is concerned with the potential impact on young people who
typically are motivated to enrol for the first time during the close of
rolls period; and
— The early close of rolls would 'place the federal electoral system out of
line with some State and Territory close of rolls legislation, possibly
leading to public confusion and complaint'.197
2.126 Professor Colin Hughes highlighted several problems with an early close
of rolls. 198 Firstly, an early close of rolls 'prevents electors who have
moved from re-enrolling for their new addresses and consequently being
removed from their old addresses', thus increasing 'the pool of departed
electors whose identities can be falsely assumed'.199 Secondly, Professor
Hughes noted that those who wish to engage in an activity that is
regulated only within fixed time limits will simply do so outside the
regulated time period.200
2.127 A number of submissions supported an early close of rolls in line with the
committee's 1998 Federal Election Inquiry Report recommendation.201
Dr Amy McGrath implied that the AEC's inability to check all enrolments
____________________________
196 Submissions p S515 (AEC).
197 Submissions p S516 (AEC).
198 Submissions p S679 (C.Hughes).
199 Submissions p S679 (C.Hughes).
200 Submissions pp S679-S680 (C.Hughes).
201 Submissions pp S88 (A.Viney), p S365 (A.Viney), p S412 (A.McGrath), p S621 (J.Lloyd) and
p S697 (P.Lindsay).
MANAGING THE ROLL 49
during the close of rolls period provides an opportunity for enrolment
fraud.202
2.128 In response to an AEC request for comments from DROs on the first AEC
submission to the current inquiry, two DROs, out of the ten DROs who
responded, indicated their support for an early close of the rolls.203
Mr Chris Goodwin, DRO for Berowra, recommended the close of rolls
occur on the same day as the announcement.204 Mr Gray Franklin, DRO
for Werriwa, recommended the close of rolls period be reduced from the
present seven days.205
2.129 Mr Allan Viney noted that section 101 (4) of the Electoral Act provides that
anyone entitled to enrol and transferring enrolment must do so within
21 days from the date of entitlement or transfer or be guilty of an
offence.206 Mr Viney pointed out that many last minute enrolments lodged
during the close of rolls period would be in breach of section 101 (4) of the
Act.207 In addition, he noted an AEC submission to the committee in 1983
acknowledging the difficulty in verifying enrolments during the close of
rolls period.208 Mr Viney recommended an ongoing advertising campaign
to 'promote civic responsibility' in terms of encouraging those eligible to
enrol or electors transferring enrolment to do so within the period
specified in the Act.209
2.130 Mr Jim Lloyd MP, Member for Robertson, stated that the level of
transactions during the close of rolls period provides 'little opportunity for
a Member to contact new enrolees or to check the validity of such
enrolments'.210 Mr Lloyd recommended closing the roll prior to the calling
of writs, 'enabling the Member to check on the genuineness of enrolments
within a reasonable timeframe'.211
2.131 Mr Peter Lindsay MP, Member for Herbert, recommended the closing of
rolls 'immediately an election is called'.212
____________________________
202 Submissions p S422 (A.McGrath).
203 Submissions p S1112 (AEC).
204 Submissions p S1094 (AEC).
205 Submissions p S1097 (AEC).
206 Submissions p S365 (A.Viney).
207 Submissions p S366 (A.Viney).
208 Submissions p S366 (A.Viney).
209 Submissions pp S366-S367 (A.Viney).
210 Submissions p S621 (J.Lloyd).
211 Submissions p S621 (J.Lloyd).
212 Submissions p S697 (P.Lindsay).
MANAGING THE ROLL 50
2.132 To preserve the integrity of the roll, the committee reiterates the relevant
recommendations of the 1996 and 1998 federal election inquiry reports.
Recommendation 6
2.133 That section 155 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 be amended to
provide that for new enrolments, the rolls for an election close on the
day the writ is issued, and for existing electors updating address details,
the rolls for an election close at 6.00pm on the third day after the issue of
the writ.
Access to the electoral roll
2.134 Another issue on which the committee has received a number of
submissions is the public availability of the roll. Under section 90 of the
Electoral Act, any organisation or person is entitled to inspect or purchase
the latest prints of the Divisional rolls.213
2.135 The AEC is aware that the publicly available roll is being used for a range
of mostly commercial purposes that are not consistent with the intention
of the Electoral Act:
There are a range of uses which over time have grown from the
existence and frequency ... of the electoral roll. Some you might
say have a greater community good than others, but most of them
are not electoral.214
2.136 The production of microfiche copies of the roll for the purposes of sale
was stopped by the AEC in March 2000 on the basis that there was no
clear legislative basis for the sale of microfiche rolls, and in response to
increasing privacy concerns about the commercial exploitation of
enrolment information.215
2.137 The withdrawal of the microfiche roll prompted a number of
organisations to make submissions to this inquiry. These included:
— the National Missing Persons Unit, which pointed out that regular
access to the microfiche roll by Non Government Organisations
____________________________
213 Submissions p S1077 (AEC).
214 Transcript p 586 (AEC), and Submissions p S1081 (AEC).
215 Submissions p S1077 (AEC).
MANAGING THE ROLL 51
involved in tracking missing persons provided them with the most
reliable and current information available;216
— the Public Trustees Office of South Australia, which stated that it used
the roll on microfiche to track will beneficiaries;217 and
— the Australian Bankers' Association, which indicated that banks have
used the roll for the purposes of processing finance applications and
combating fraud.218
2.138 A number of other organisations also expressed a similar concern about
access to the microfiche roll.219
2.139 The proposed use of the rolls by the above organisations is not
encompassed within the purpose for which personal elector information is
collected by the AEC under the Electoral Act, that is, to establish a public
roll of those people eligible to vote at elections for the federal parliament.
Neither are they one of the permitted purposes inserted in the electoral
and referendum regulations in recent years, which mainly relate to
Commonwealth activities in the protection of revenue and the prosecution
of crime:
If personal elector information ... is made available to
organisations for purposes unrelated to the electoral process, it is
possible that an increasing number of electors will avoid electoral
enrolment because of the decreasing personal privacy entailed ... In
general, the AEC is opposed to proposals that seek to expand the
permitted uses for personal elector information, because a
reduction in the completeness and accuracy of the Electoral Roll is
a likely outcome.220
2.140 According to the Privacy Commissioner, because it is compulsory to
provide personal information for inclusion on the roll, citizens have a
strong expectation that this information will only be used for the purpose
for which it was collected:
One of the fundamental principles of information privacy is that
personal information that is provided by an individual for one
purpose should not be used or disclosed for another unrelated
____________________________
216 Submissions p S7 (National Missing Persons Unit).
217 Submissions pp S553-S555 (Public Trustee).
218 Submissions p S360 (Australian Bankers' Association).
219 Submissions pp S768-S769 (Benevolent Society), p S783 (Vanish) pp S799-S800 (Rite Recovery
Service), pp S1067-S1068 (Salvation Army SA Division), and pp S1279-S1302 (Sacred Heart
College Foundation).
220 Submissions p S1078 (AEC).
MANAGING THE ROLL 52
purpose unless the individual has consented or there are sound
public interest reasons for doing so.
221
2.141 The Privacy Commissioner stated that there is increasing evidence to
suggest that the existing privacy regime, constituted in the privacy and
electoral acts, is no longer effective in preventing inappropriate use of the
roll.
222
2.142 Recommendation 53 of the committee's inquiry into the 1996 federal
election was that sections 89 to 92 of the Electoral Act be reviewed to take
into account developments in computer technology.
223
These sections also
cover public access to enrolment information. The AEC indicated it had
delayed the review because of intervening electoral events and committee
inquiries, including the current inquiry.
224
2.143 When completed, the AEC will publish the review, entitled Review of the
Legislation governing Access to Enrolment Information, as a research report on
its internet site. The review will be provided to the committee, the
Minister, and the Privacy Commissioner for consideration.
225
Judging by
the comments of the Privacy Commissioner in his submission to this
inquiry, the committee believes action on this issue should not be delayed
much longer.
Recommendation 7
2.144 That the Australian Electoral Commission complete its review of
sections 89 to 92 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 in sufficient
time for the committee to consider this matter during the next federal
election inquiry.
____________________________
221 Submissions p S630 (Federal Privacy Commissioner).
222 Submissions p S630 (Federal Privacy Commissioner).
223 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 1997. The 1996 Federal Election: Report of the
Inquiry into the conduct of the 1996 Federal Election and matters related thereto. Canberra, AGPS,
p 94.
224 Submissions p S1083 (AEC).
225 Submissions p S1084 (AEC).
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, Canberra
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